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ABSTRACT
The unprecedented ubiquity with which technological advancements, such as blockchain, the
Internet of things (IoT), big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI), are impacting the
world has forced large organizations to rethink their information technology roadmaps. Their
decisions about how they invest in technology have become more important. It is against this
backdrop that companies must decide how much to invest in their aging technologies versus these
new potentially transformational ones. A decision is only as good as the information available to the
decision-makers when they make it. This research project seeks to understand the effects that
information asymmetry has on strategic information technology (IT) investment decisions within
large complex organizations. The data collected for this study was gathered from six executives. The
conceptual model was grounded in Akerlof’s (1978) seminal paper on information asymmetry. This
study followed an Action Design Research (ADR) approach to formulate the problem and an
elaborated Action Design Research (eADR) process model to create a solution. Results indicate that
using the proposed solution will result in organizations making more informed strategic IT
investment decisions.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Motivation
In November 2017, Shelley Broader, the CEO of Chico’s FAS, a Fortune 1000 company,
spoke at a University of South Florida (U.S.F.) breakfast and, in her opening remarks, she
highlighted a common situation with large corporations—for a shared services operating model, her
firm had duplicates of a lot of things. In addition, there were several systems of record for the same
data elements. She further explained that her primary strategic priority was to weed out duplicate
processes and tools. Specifically, she targeted the elimination of what she referred to as “skunk
works” that sprung up throughout her firm and typically resulted in the acquisition of IT software
and hardware that was not centrally approved. The driving motivation for Shelley was cost, and
without an expense line in her income statement that aligned to revenue projections, she would see
her firm move toward bankruptcy (Broader, 2017). I believe the issues with Broader’s enterprise
information systems to be endemic of all large complex organizations, and I propose that the issue
cannot be resolved until researchers discover and confirm the factors involved and their interactions.
This research project advances our understanding of how strategic IT investment decisions are
made.
Unfortunately, most firms do not address the problem until they are in Broader’s situation,
with market or competitive forces forcing them to take dramatic action. Once they are forced to act,
I have seen firms attempt to fix Broader’s problem in many ways. Two of the most common include
1) purchasing more software and 2) creating additional projects. The software often purchased
includes tools categorized as IT Asset Management. These tools are targeted at identifying IT
1

hardware, software, and support contracts within an enterprise. In theory, once these assets have
been identified, a firm is able to understand who, if anyone, is using the assets. Another common
approach to improving an inefficient and expensive enterprise information system is investing in a
“data team” and purchasing software for them to discover and manage data critical to enterprise
performance. While purchasing software is common, firms like Broader’s also create new projects,
with the expectation of eliminating redundant and unnecessary technology assets, including the
associated human capital. These projects are typically called “portfolio rationalization” investments,
where “portfolio” is defined as all the people, processes, and tools that comprise an enterprise
information system.
I have seen these investments in discovery cost millions of dollars and wind up with limited
short-term benefits—while still proclaimed as wins by executives—and then return to business as
usual with neither a reduction in operating expenses nor materially improved business performance.
I propose that the primary reason for this behavior is that the problem is very complex and requires
a transformation of the way enterprise information systems are managed at large complex firms.
After all, if investment in software and projects is required to simply identify the existence of
technology assets, it raises the question: “If we don’t know what we have, how do we know how it is
all engineered to work together?”
My experience in practice—including 11 years where I played a role in the strategic IT
investment decision-making process—led me to discover that much of the information required to
make sound strategic IT investment decisions is not communicated to decision-makers. The IT
investment decision-making process is elaborate at large complex organizations. It involves longrange strategic plans, annual budgets, and the participation of many experts from IT, the business
units, and most functional support areas. A material level of trust is required as a foundation for
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approving budgets and investing in technology. My experience struggling to discover information
and to identify owners of the data motivated me to explore this phenomenon.
Research Goals and Approach
As highlighted above, it is alarming that organizations need to invest millions of dollars just
to discover what assets they own and employ. This reveals that there may not be an owner of
enterprise information system engineering and, if there is, the owner is not maintaining the artifacts
that are required to perform system design and engineering work. My experience indicates that
architecture teams lack the artifacts and processes required to manage the overall engineering of an
enterprise information system. A key requirement for engineering a system is to have state diagrams
revealing the current and future instantiations. Without these artifacts, strategic and tactical activity
lacks coherency. This research project sought to discover and confirm the factors that lead to
information being unavailable to strategic IT investment decision-makers. This study also sought to
discover the role played by architects in the enterprise information system investment decisionmaking process. The need for this role is supported by recent research highlighting the need for
engineering for the continuous adaptation of the agile enterprise (Hinkelmann et al., 2016). Finally,
the primary goal of this research project was to offer a solution that reduces information asymmetry
and improves decision-making.
An essential element of this research was an understanding of the factors that contribute to
poor IT investment decisions. To this end, data was collected from six executives over the course of
two separate studies. The first study sought to discover how business and information technology
leaders plan and execute changes to information technology. Participants in this first study were
included due to their unique perspectives, having been leaders within both IT and business. The data
collected in this first study was coded and analyzed. The first study showed that there are significant
information asymmetries between IT and business leaders when they make strategic IT investment
3

decisions. This informed the second study, which examined how these information asymmetries
between business and IT affect IT investment decisions. The first and second studies then informed
the creation of an artifact that aimed at reducing information asymmetry in the IT investment
decision-making process.
The artifact was co-created in practice with a participant from the second exploratory set of
interviews. In addition to participating in the strategic IT investment decision-making process, he is
accountable for all relevant investment data communicated to the other decision-makers. The
objective of this final phase of research was to build an artifact that the participant could validate
and use to improve his current process. An elaborated Action Design Research (eADR) process was
followed to create the solution.
Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant concepts.
Chapter 3 follows with a discussion of the research questions and method. Chapter 4 details the first
exploratory study and its role in problem formulation. Following Chapter 4, the second study—
discovering evidence of technical debt as a type of information asymmetry—is explained in Chapter
5. Chapter 6 describes the design, creation and validation of the artifact. A detailed account of
artifact build is included in Chapter 6. This dissertation concludes with Chapter 7, which summarizes
the findings, details the contributions, and offers recommendations for future research.

4

CHAPTER TWO:
RELEVANT CONCEPTS
Introduction
This research is grounded in two concepts—information asymmetry and technical debt.
Information asymmetry, as detailed in Akerlof’s (1978) seminal paper, describes the behavior of a
buyer and seller, where the seller has more information about the quality of a car. IT purchases
within large complex firms have significant information asymmetries between the funding entity (the
business) and the seller (IT), making the concept of information asymmetry core to understanding
the IT investment process. Alves et al. (2016) defined 15 types of technical debt. Technical debt
serves as the context for information asymmetry regarding IT investments. That is, technical debt is
a class of information that is not equally shared or understood by parties to an IT investment
decision within large complex organizations.
Information Asymmetry
Harris, Kriebe, and Raviv (1982) found that decentralized organizations suffer from the
effects of information asymmetry between subunits and headquarter functions and that individuals
with specialized information and expertise also possess information not shared with others. Some of
the information asymmetry within organizations is self-inflicted. For example, the current research
project’s preliminary findings included the following experience of a participant when he attempted
to offer input to IT:
I continue to be amazed in my current role, where it’s like, “Well you’re not in technology.” I
understand I’m not in technology, but to totally dismiss all of my prior 13, 14 years of
technology experience because I’m now in the business is so shortsighted and foolish.
5

While on the surface information asymmetry is a self-evident concept, there are discrete
behaviors it produces that impact decision-making. When information asymmetry exists between
entities involved in a decision, two problematic effects may materialize: adverse selection and moral
hazard. As described by Nayyar (1990), adverse selection occurs when a buyer is unable to observe
information available to the seller. For example, the seller of a used car has more information than
the buyer about the quality of the car. Buyers can also have more information than sellers. For
example, people purchasing insurance have better information about their health and how they
expect to behave after they purchase the insurance than sellers. For example, they may begin
consuming more alcohol or smoking. The adverse selection problem occurs in the context of this
research when the entity asking for IT investment funding has more information about the potential
for unfavorable outcomes than the party approving the funding does. In large complex
organizations, pressure to secure funding for investment is high. Managers compete for limited
funding and without an IT investment to manage; exceeding annual performance goals is a
challenge. In addition to differentiating an employee when annual reviews occur, managing large
projects is a stepping stone to higher levels of responsibility and leadership. Rarely is a person asked
to lead strategic investments when she has not successfully led smaller scale investments. For these
reasons, gaining approval for IT investment proposals is critical to a person’s career. This situation
leads to information asymmetry as those selling the investments are incentivized to paint the
investment in the best possible light.
Executives charged with approving IT investments make their decisions primarily based on
information provided during presentations about the investment from the individuals requesting
funding. They can make an adverse selection if not all relevant information is shared with them. As
Nayyar (1990) explained, moral hazard involves one party to a transaction taking more risk than the
other because the other party absorbs the cost of the risk. Moral hazard occurs after an investment
6

decision has been made. At this point, sponsors and managers of the IT investments are expected to
deliver the promised scope within the budget and timeline agreed to by the approvers of funding.
When execution does not go as planned, the scope must be trimmed and/or quality must be
reduced in order to deliver on time. Moral hazard surfaces when sponsors and project managers,
whose professional success is tied to delivering the promised scope within the agreed timeline and
budget, are incentivized to withhold information reflecting the true status of the investment. Many
times, the shortcuts taken, outstanding defects, unused functionalities, etc. don’t surface until the
sponsor and project manager have moved on to their next roles, and accountability for the situation
becomes murky, as support personnel absorb the blame for the resulting situation.
Consider the effects of information asymmetry on any specific project investment
negotiation. The IT and business staff have very different perspectives and detailed knowledge
related to a project (or current context). In addition, asymmetries are likely to arise from more
general differences in educational background, as well as internal and external experience. As
explained by Eisenhardt (1989), the principal-agent problem (from agency theory) focuses on the
relationship between two parties, where one party (the principal) delegates work to the other party
(the agent). This problem applies to the context of this paper as IT personnel (agents) are potentially
making somewhat self-interested decisions without the business side (principals) being fully
informed. Information asymmetry can be expressed as adverse selection driven by IT staff based on
prior knowledge or as moral hazard, as detailed knowledge is accumulated throughout a project.
System development obviously takes time, so the context here is not really a single decision.
In Akerlof’s (1978) classic paper on information asymmetry, a thought experiment based on selling
used cars is presented. Clearly, the seller of a used car has private information about any “lemon”
being offered to a buyer (Akerlof, 1978). However, this is a one-off decision to purchase or not,
without any ongoing liability between the parties (except for so-called lemon laws in some
7

jurisdictions). In the context of systems development, there are periodic renegotiations between IT
and business representatives as the project progresses. The finance literature includes research on
this topic, including the renegotiations that characterize corporate lending as both borrower and
lender learn more or face changing conditions (Roberts, 2015). In this study, we have much the
same situation, with IT staff (borrowers) and business managers (lenders) learning as the project
progresses and renegotiating as milestones are reached.
While opportunities to share information relevant to IT investment decisions exist
throughout a calendar year, this research project highlights some of the reasons information sharing
does not regularly occur. It is within this context that information asymmetry plays a role in the
quality of IT investment decisions.
Technical Debt
Technical debt is a concept first introduced by Ward Cunningham in 1993. Cunningham
(1993) defined it as delivering not-quite-right code in order to expedite delivery of software. The
past 10 years have seen increased academic interest in technical debt. There have been nine
International Workshops on Managing Technical Debt since 2010, with the latest held in May 2017.
The workshops culminated in The First International Conference on Technical Debt, held in
Gothenburg, Sweden, May 27-28, 2018 and collocated with the International Conference on
Software Engineering (ICSE) 2018. In addition to the workshops and conference, the Journal of
Systems and Software recently dedicated a special issue to technical debt (Falessi, Kruchten, &
Avgeriou, 2016). Moreover, a chapter focusing on architectural technical debt—a type of technical
debt—was written by Li, Liang, and Avgeriou (2014) in the first edition of a recently published book
entitled Economics-Driven Software Architecture (Mistrík, Bahsoon, Kazman, & Zhang, 2014). While this
is a relatively nascent discipline, the consistent annual devotion of a core group of academics
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participating in workshops and publishing literature serves as evidence that the discipline has taken
root.
The definition of technical debt has been broadened to include more than the code
deficiencies that Cunningham (1993) highlighted. Alves et al. (2016) provided a literature mapping,
which identifies and defines 15 types of technical debt. The types of technical debt include design,
architecture, documentation, test, code, defect, requirements, infrastructure, people, test automation,
process, build, service, usability, and versioning debt (Alves et al., 2016). Appendix A lists the
definitions for each of the 15 types of technical debt.
While most of the technical debt research has focused on technical constructs, the academic
community has acknowledged the importance of broadening the lens to include the financial aspects
of managing technical debt (see Ampatzoglou, Ampatzoglou, Chatzigeorgiou, & Avgeriou, 2015).
Further support for broadening the research focus of technical debt was agreed upon at the 2016
Dagstuhl Seminar 16162 workshop on managing technical debt, where one of the findings
concluded, “there are also other phenomena that are related to technical debt that should be studied,
such as other types of ‘debt’” (Avgeriou, Kruchten, Ozkaya, & Seaman, 2016). The following
definition of technical debt was agreed to at the Dagstuhl Seminar 16162:
In software-intensive systems, technical debt is a collection of design or implementation
constructs that are expedient in the short term but set up a technical context that can make
future changes more costly or impossible. Technical debt presents an actual or contingent
liability whose impact is limited to internal system qualities, primarily maintainability and
evolvability. (Gemeinschaft, 2016)
Ampatzoglou et al. (2015) argued that much of the technical debt research uses ambiguous
terminology and sometimes misuses terms. This confusion adds to the challenge of IT professionals
adopting the technical debt-related terminology. If research and standards are not clear and
9

meaningful to IT professionals, they are left to their own interpretations of what is important
regarding technical debt and what should and should not be communicated to their managers,
finance departments, and business stakeholders. Therefore, finance professionals who are familiar
with the term are likely very rare. One participant in the preliminary study explained that it requires
… really getting into the details and looking under the covers with some of these
calculations. You can really sway a business person’s perspective of what is their opinion,
because that’s what it comes down to sometimes, what is the opinion of this TCO number
because it’s subjective. You can input a lot of variables into a specific cost or you could keep
them out and put them somewhere else.
What is common are finance professionals or business stakeholders who struggle to understand why
IT operations and maintenance budgets continue to climb when large capital investments in
information technology are approved every year in order to not only improve capabilities, but also,
in many cases, to reduce maintenance expenses.
While a core group of academics and practitioners have gained traction in defining and
socializing the technical debt phenomenon, it remains a nascent discipline without a developed
theory. This hinders the ability for IT professionals to effectively communicate, as the tools and
methods for capturing technical debt items are only just beginning to gain broad adoption. A
positive sign is the adoption of standards published in December 2017 by the Object Management
Group (OMG), in collaboration with the Consortium for IT Software Quality (CISQ) (OMG, 2017).
Technical debt defines the information landscape and possible asymmetries in specific areas.
Based on a meta-analysis, Alves et al. (2016) outlined 15 categories of technical debt that can affect
development projects. The gap between IT and business is exacerbated when there is no shared
understanding of technical debt. Therefore, efforts to define, standardize, and measure technical
debt can alleviate the effects of information asymmetry.
10

CHAPTER THREE:
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD
Research Questions
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research method employed to answer the
following two high-level research questions:
RQ1: How does information asymmetry affect strategic IT investment decisions?
RQ2: Can we improve IT investment decisions by reducing information asymmetry at the
point an initial investment decision is made?
Research Method
Three phases of research—the first two answering the research questions that inform the
next phase of research—were executed. The aggregate findings of the three phases of research were
expected to answer the two high-level research questions posed above. Figure 1 summarizes the
three phases that comprised the research approach. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this dissertation are each
dedicated to a single phase (1, 2, and 3, respectively).
Over the course of my career within and leading business and IT functions, I formed
entrenched views on the impacts of, root causes of, and potential solutions to the situation.
Therefore, for the duration of this research project, it was important I compartmentalize, or
“bracket” (Colaizzi, 1978), my views and suspend judgment in accordance with phenomenological
research requirements and provide an unbiased reflection of the phenomenon. While Colaizzi (1978)
recognized that this could never be completely accomplished, I satisfied his requirement by
continuously questioning if I was shaping the data or if the data were organically surfacing insights.
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Moreover, I continuously paraphrased what I heard from participants and requested that they
confirm my understanding of what they said.

Figure 1. Research approach.
Action Design Research
This research project began as an action design research (ADR) effort, with the expectation
that an artifact would be built, an intervention would occur, and an evaluation would take place
concurrently (Sein, Henfridsson, Purao, Rossi, & Lindgren, 2011). Sein et al. (2011) qualified
artifacts as ensembles, i.e., bundles of hardware and software, as defined by Orlikowski and Iacono
(2001). While this definition is specific in its use of hardware and/or software in defining artifacts,
there is evidence that the ADR methodology is generalizable to the creation of artifacts that improve
processes. Specifically, I applied this methodology to the creation of an instrument that improves
the initial strategic IT investment decision process. Adapting ADR for a broader than originally
intended application is not a novel idea, and growth of the model continues (Mullarkey & Hevner,
2018). In fact, Gregor and Hevner (2013) cited Goldkuhl (2002) as the source for defining a process
as an artificially made object that qualifies as an artifact. Finally, foundational design science research
12

by Hevner et al. (2004) lists part of the constituent community for IS research as “practitioners who
plan, manage, design, implement, operate, and evaluate information systems” (Von Alan, March,
Park, & Ram, 2004). This research targets the improvement of process that benefits all roles through
the reduction of information asymmetry.

Figure 2. ADR method: stages and principles (Sein et al., 2011).
The rationale for this application of the ADR methodology in this novel way, i.e., to improve
a process, is that all the required stages and principles comprising ADR, portrayed in Figure 2, can
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be satisfied when viewing an instrument that improves a process as analogous to a software or
hardware artifact that solves a problem. As partial evidence, upon completion of phases one and two
of this research project, stage one of the ADR methodology was complete—a problem had been
formed and both principles had been satisfied.
Problem formulation can be triggered by a researcher’s expectation, or it can emanate from
practice (Sein et al., 2011). Sein et al. (2011) prescribed the steps involved in the problem
formulation stage. In addition to an initial empirical investigation of the problem, the steps include
determining the initial scope, deciding the roles and scope for practitioner participation, and
formulating the initial research questions. I perceived the problem as a practitioner and collected
data from practice to validate the existence and magnitude of the problem. To this end, practitioners
that have played a unique dual role of having led IT and business organizations involved in strategic
IT investment decision-making were identified.
Semi-structured interviews with the practitioners were employed as the method of data
collection for the initial exploration of the problem. The first review focused exclusively on
common words and phrasing. A second review of the data was then conducted with a focus on
surfacing themes from the interviews. The approach described by Seidman (2013) was followed for
analyzing thematic connections within and between transcripts. A mind map was generated by hand
through an iterative process of discovery until the final set of themes surfaced.
Following the identification of themes, I looked for research that might help explain the type
of data that emerged. I discovered a relatively recent article published in Information and Software
Technology, a top tier journal as defined in 2018 by the Muma College of Business at the University of
South Florida. For the complete list of Information Systems and Decision Sciences (ISDS) journal
rankings see Appendix B. This article identified a taxonomy of terms that I used to classify the data
from the second set of interviews. Whereas the initial coding for the first two interviews employed a
14

bottom-up approach, the coding method I used for this second set of data was defined by Auerbach
and Silverstein (2003) as a top-down, or second cycle, approach, called Elaborative Coding.
The second set of interviews was conducted with four executives at large complex
organizations. Large complex organizations are defined as those with annual information technology
budgets exceeding $500 million. The coding of these interviews is explained in Chapter 5. This
coding further informed my understanding of the problem and led me to narrow the scope of the
research project from strategic IT investment decisions to the initial strategic IT investment
decisions, when the high-level funding is approved—thereby excluding all subsequent phase-gate
approvals and any change requests requiring additional funding decisions. In addition to narrowing
the scope, I also refined the research questions and identified information asymmetry as a grounding
theory for the research. In addition, I discovered that using the taxonomy for the elaborative coding
had significant explanatory value. The taxonomy used was called technical debt and, while not a
theory, the concept resonated significantly enough with the participants that it warranted inclusion
in this research as a grounding concept. Information asymmetry served as the grounding theory,
thereby satisfying the first principle of problem formulation, as shown in Figure 1 above, and data
collected from active practitioners satisfied the second principle.
In addition to the principles for problem formulation, I secured a long-term commitment from a
participant for the remaining part of the study. Furthermore, I completed the tasks listed in Figure 3,
which are required by the problem formulation stage, as detailed by Sein et al. (2011). Of the steps I
have not discussed, step three was accomplished by the abstraction of an artifact. If I solved this
problem for a discrete decision, it is possible that many more decisions where significant
information asymmetry within an organization could also be improved by extending this solution.
Step six was accomplished by clarifying with the remaining participant, who agreed to participate in
artifact creation and validation. I continued to meet with him to review the results of prior
15

interactions in an iterative fashion. He served as the expert practitioner while I ensured that a
rigorous process was followed as the next stages of the research project were executed.
(1 ) Identify and conceptualize the research opportunity
(2) Formulate initial research questions
(3) Cast the problem as an instance of a class of problems
(4) Identify contributing theoretical bases and prior technology advances
(5) Secure long-term organizational commitment
(6) Set up roles and responsibilities

Figure 3. ADR tasks in the problem formulation stage (Sein et al., 2011).
Due to the allotted time to complete this dissertation and the context of the problem being
addressed, a decision was made to use the elaborated action design research (eADR) process model
for the remainder of this study. The timeframe was months and the nature of the problem being
addressed included strategic IT investment decisions that are typically made once per year during a
formal planning process. Evidence reflecting the soundness of a decision is typically not available
until a year or more after the initial decision, as the duration of strategic investment projects is long.
This lengthy process required a simulated evaluation of the performance of a designed instrument
upon which reflection and learning would be captured. This raised the question of how feasible
ADR is for a process that takes a long time to generate performance metrics, unlike a software
artifact where evaluation can be executed relatively quickly. Therefore, eADR was viewed as a more
appropriate method to complete the study, as it allowed for 1) entry into the process at the design
stage and 2) artifact abstraction as a generalization of the build activity (Mullarkey & Hevner, 2018).
The implementation, evaluation, and learning would have to be simulated for this research project.
I recognize that eADR could have been employed for the entire research project, and I could
have retrofitted the initial process to the eADR methodology. I believe it is more important to
reflect the actual method employed in this research project. Further, this bifurcation within the
methodology is acceptable, as eADR extends ADR and does not change the core of the problem
16

formulation stage. I stumbled on eADR as I iterated several times during the problem formulation
stage and generated more than one abstraction of an artifact.
Elaborated Action Design Research (eADR)
Mullarkey and Hevner (2018) introduced eADR as a process model, which is provided in
Figure 4. I entered the model at the design phase and used the result of the coding from the
problem formulation/diagnosis stage of the first study to seed the initial design of the instrument
with content. I prepared a draft of the instrument to serve as a baseline for initial iteration. Two
design iterations of the instrument were conducted in praxis and resulted in the co-creation of an
instrument built by the researcher and practitioner. Each design iteration satisfied the eADR model
requirements by including activities that resulted in problem formulation/planning, artifact creation,
artifact evaluation, reflection, and learning.

Figure 4. The ADR process model with research entry points (Mullarkey & Hevner, 2018).
Ethical Considerations
While this research project involved human subjects, it was determined that IRB approval
was not required. The participants are business professionals and their participation was limited to
their professional experience and expert opinions. The conversations may have occurred organically
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due to ISO 2015 standards, which require companies to consider and implement opportunities for
improvement within their organizations.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
EVIDENCE FROM DUAL-ROLE EXECUTIVES EXPOSING THE BUSINESS-IT
DIVIDE
Introduction
In 1967, a mere decade after the introduction of the first computer programming languages,
Russell Ackoff began questioning the value of management information systems, which today we
call “IT” (Ackoff, 1967). His view on the value of such systems is evident in the title of his paper,
where he labels them “misinformation systems”. The following half-century has seen global IT
investment skyrocket to $3.5 trillion annually in 2017 (Lovelock et al., 2018). While advances in
technology have undoubtedly benefited industry and society, the failure rate for IT projects remains
between 30-70%, data has never been more at risk, and little academic research exists proving that
businesses benefit from IT investment. This is not for a lack of trying; the problem is just extremely
complex. The large amount of investment and abysmal failure rates beg for continued investigation.
Some researchers have focused on the problem in discrete areas: for example, on the
geography (Tam, 1998), size (Chaya, 1996), or industry (Ho & Mallick, 2010) of a firm. Others have
examined the role of the diffusion of technology within firms, alignment of IT investment with
strategy, and measures of IT value. While these efforts have resulted in advancing discrete strains of
research, they have been academically isolated. By failing to provide context for the breadth of the
problem and to advance toward a common objective, the ability to assess the value of IT
investments has been hamstrung and practice continues to provide suboptimal technology solutions
for individual firms.
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The genesis for this exploratory research was to discover insight into the problem at its root,
at the time when IT investment decisions are made. Rather than continue to approach the problem
from discrete academic disciplines without a requirement to advance a comprehensive
understanding with a clear endgame, I look to discover the phenomena that exist at the point of
making IT investment decisions with the expectation that insights will emerge. I entered this
examination of IT investment decisions with the supposition that it will lead to advancing our
knowledge, which may result in benefits for practice.
This chapter is structured in the following way. First I provide the statement of the research
question, followed by a description of the research methodology and its appropriateness. I then
review the study design, method, and data collected. Next, I offer an analysis of the information
collected followed by a discussion of findings. I conclude by outlining an informed approach for the
next step of this research project.
Research Question
As a first step toward understanding the phenomenon being explored by the two high-level research
questions for this research study, a process model was created based upon the experience I have in
creating and implementing the IT investment process at two large complex firms. I modeled the life
of a typical IT investment in Figure 5 to isolate the context of the problem and facilitate engagement
with practitioners.
Information Technology System Priorities Declared

Portfolio Rationalization
(Two dimensions: Perpetual Activities and Targeted
at Specific Change)

Information System Change is Implemented

Information System Change Created/Developed
AND
Technical Debt is Incurred

Change to Business Value

Longitudinal Process of Business Change
(Two dimensions: Perpetual and Directly Traceable
to Specific IS Change)

Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment of a
Firm's Value

Passage of Time

Figure 5. Lifecycle of an IT investment.
In addition to formulating the problem, the goal of this initial research was to answer the following
explanatory research question:
20

RQ: How do business and information technology managers and directors plan and execute
changes to information technology and systems that do not result in optimal returns, as
measured by value of a firm?
Research Method
My professional experience and dialogue with colleagues over the last 20 years led me to
believe that managers and directors of business and information technology teams are often placed
in the awkward position of deciding to support local functionality or business performance at the
expense of misaligning with optimal enterprise-level information system design and performance.
There is an abundance of published literature targeted at explaining aspects of this phenomenon
within the IT Business Value body of knowledge. For comprehensive reviews of the literature
through 2004, see Bakos and Kemerer (1992), Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996), Kauffman and Weill
(1989), and Melville, Kraemer, and Gurbaxani (2004).
Most of the research published in the last 20 years has focused on providing a framework for
assessing the value of factors relevant to information technology impacting business value: for
example, technical debt and IT-Business alignment, where Google Scholar searches yield dozens of
published articles. Another concentration of research is focused on offering frameworks intended to
better execute some aspect of the IT-Business Value equation. While the problem of scientifically
explaining and controlling IT investment in a way that results in optimized behavior within firms is
researched annually in a material way, a gap in the research exists. The gap is the dearth of research
leveraging the practical experience of mid-level business and information technology managers who
influence technology investments and are tasked with executing the investments. These front-line
leaders shape the value story at its source, where information system change occurs. Their direct
responsibility for implementing change gives them unique insight into the difficult challenge of
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connecting specific investments in IT to changes in the value of a firm. This study seeks to tell their
story.
As mentioned in the research method section of this paper, ADR was chosen as the research
method. The first step in the methodology requires formulation of a problem. The process of
forming the problem requires that two principles are adhered to: the research must be practiceinspired and it must be theory-ingrained (Mullarkey & Hevner, 2015). By engaging practice in this
exploratory research, the first of the two principles was satisfied. The second principle was realized
in the next study, as the theory was identified.
Finally, in addition to maintaining an objective view of the data, as described in the research
method of this paper, it was important to limit the scope of this exploratory effort to two
participants, due to the limited timeframe available to complete this phase of the research and the
challenge in finding participants who satisfy the unique criteria for participation.
Data Collection
To maximize insight into the problem statement, participants were sought that have led at
the Manager or Director level in both IT and business. Having leadership experience in both fields
yields unique insight, compared to those who have led in only IT or business. For this research, I
define business as any function that does not report to the CIO of an organization. As this study
was limited to weeks, not months, a relatively small number of participants—two—from different
organizations were targeted for interviews. In addition, the participants were required to be current
manager- or director-level employees that have had direct decision-making authority to buy or build
information technology solutions for their respective organizations that materially contributed to the
enterprise information system of the firm. Materiality for this research was defined as having
responsibility for at least $1,000,000 in annual IT spending in at least one of the years between 2013
and 2017. While subjective, the figure $1,000,000 was chosen because the phenomenon being
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examined is only interesting when organizations grow to a scale where complexity becomes a
material concern. When firms are small, silos are uncommon, and strategy is naturally easier to
communicate. Small budgets and simple organizational structures are void of the complexity driving
the phenomenon addressed in this research. The management of significant financial investment
ensures that communication of business value is expected when IT investment is sought. It is
assumed that material investments require communication with the owner of the investment
throughout the IT investment lifecycle, as seen in Figure 5 above.
Figure 5 is the conceptual model that framed this data collection activity and was shared with
the participants prior to the interviews. The interviews were planned for 45 minutes. They were
expected to end either on time or sooner, if requested by the interviewee. The interviews were
conducted in person at a location of the participant’s choosing. Access to the participants was the
result of personal and professional relationships I have with each of them. They both reported
directly to me at some point in their careers when each was a Director. It has been at least five years
since the participants reported to me.
A guiding set of interview questions was prepared and is listed in Appendix C. The list was
not intended to generate specific answers, but rather to guide discussion in the event the model was
not enough to adequately generate dialogue. This approach is called semi-structured interviewing
and allows for the interview to be guided by questions, although the questions may not be asked in
exactly the same way they are written and only a subset of questions may be asked of all participants
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Once completed, the interviews were transcribed by hand and reviewed
twice for coding and analysis. The first coding review focused exclusively on common words and
phrasing. Once each interview transcript was reviewed for word and phrasing commonality, a
second coding step was employed, which focused on surfacing themes within the interviews. The
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approach described by Seidman (2013) was followed for analyzing thematic connections within and
between the transcripts.
Once themes were identified, a hard copy of each transcript was highlighted identifying
every relevant experience related to one of the themes. The highlighted sections were numbered
with numbers placed on the mind map next to the appropriate theme and subgroupings under the
surfaced themes. One page of the mind map is included in Appendix D for reference. 1 Table 1
includes the variables and theme subgroupings that emerged from the coding and mind mapping.
An example of the specific mapping of transcript passages to themes and subgroups is listed in
Appendix D. It is important to note that at this stage of the research activity that “IT investment
decisions” had a broad meaning. The context included all investment-related decisions.
Table 1
Mapping participant comments to variables influencing IT investment decisions

Participant 1 (P1)**
Participant 2 (P2)**
Sub-grouping
Frequency
37
Collaboration & Trust
5, 18
28, 43, 44
Negotiation
14
Clear Understanding
16, 18, 19
14, 30, 41, 42
Siloed
1, 7, 11, 18
20, 33, 35
External Stakeholders
Customers
14
1, 2, 7, 21, 31
Vendors & Partners
3, 7
Organizational Dynamics*
Skill & Domain Competency
2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 19
4, 8, 9, 16, 25, 27
Leadership Maturity
24, 26, 40
Location of People
41
Architectural Influence
N/A
8
15, 17, 18, 31. 32
Business Strategy
N/A
11, 14, 15
23
Motivation (IT Managers)
Measures of Work
8, 10, 19
38
Day-to-Day
19, 22
Governance & Valuation
Financial
9, 10, 14
5, 10
Intangible Value
10
6, 21
Requirements
16
29
Other
8, 12, 13, 17, 19
12, 13, 34, 35, 36, 39
*Other dependencies in the table, while also organizational dynamics, are broken out due to the materiality of the comments
**Numbers listed under each Participant identify lines of coding from each transcript (See Appendix E for an example)

Variable
Communication

1

The only missing theme from the mind map is Communication. It did not all fit on the page, so Communication
was listed on a separate page.
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Model Validation
Overall validation of the model was shared by both participants, with Participant 2 (P2)
explaining, “the model is relevant both to my last position, and obviously, my current position.” The
model is very high-level and appeared to be self-evident to both participants. The discussion with
each participant predominantly centered on attributes of the model reflected as themes and
subgroups provided in Table 1. These attributes reflect dynamics operating within the model. The
fact that the discussion focused on more detailed attributes leads me to believe that the model will
have to be enhanced if it is to serve a practical purpose in advancing understanding, changing
behavior, and improving performance in practice and academia.
Analysis
The following analysis covers several themes that emerged during discussion with the
participants. The themes (listed in Table 1 above) include a mapping of participant comments. The
model in Figure 5 above seemed to be self-evident to both participants, and many of the
participants’ experiences validated and provided exemplars of the model. In addition to validating
several constructs of the model, their experiences raised the importance of weighting dimensions of
the model, as some influences reflected in the model have relatively more impact on the process
than others. Some aspects of the model were not affirmed, which are discussed below. Finally, the
coding and thematic analysis identified several new dimensions that should be included in the model,
which are also discussed below.
Regarding the identification of frequently used words, the participants used different words
to describe experiences. Thus, individual words did not lead to any insight or connection between
the experiences of the two participants. For example, one participant used the word “language” to
refer to the importance of understanding a business or technical domain. The other participant also
described the importance of understanding how other domains communicated and the importance
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of domain knowledge, but he did not use the word language. As Table 1 reveals, the participants
surfaced many common themes. These themes, while communicated in different words, are the
focus of the analysis and discussion. The themes and sub-themes are listed as variables and
subgroups, respectively, in Appendix E.
In the sections below, I describe the relationship between lived experiences and high-level
constructs of the model in Figure 5. This approach is intended to best communicate the insights and
experiences shared by the participants.
Communication
Communication was discussed more than any other theme. Dependence on communication
was mentioned in the context of frequency, collaboration and trust, negotiation, silos, and clarity.
Regarding frequency, P2 explained,
… when tech gets into trouble it is because they are given a big capital budget, the business
then kind of steps away. Technology then runs with it and they build this stuff and at the
end of the year they say, “Aren’t you so happy?” and the business sponsor goes “Not really,
this isn’t what I wanted.” (P2)
While P2 spoke passionately throughout the interview, when relaying this experience, he had a
heightened sense of passion and his frustration was palpable.
Collaboration and trust go hand-in-hand; without trust, the collaboration is challenged. P1
referred to the importance of trust several times. He explained its importance as follows,
You get to a certain level where I think the manager or the business professional can’t have
that knowledge, they’re just too broad of a focus area, so they rely on trust to really know
whether something is being handled or not and I think that’s one of the things that been
successful for me is that I’ve been able to instill trust in those above me when I get in the
technology situations. (P1)
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While P1 views trust from his manager as positive, he later highlights the negative impact of a lack
of trust. He explained that IT team members, “are used to kind of the business not really being able
to talk the language, so they try and keep me at an arm’s length, so it’s difficult for me to really get
the intel on what’s truly happening” with his projects. P2 was blunter as he explained his experience,
highlighting the lack of trust and its impact on collaboration.
And what’s amazing is the individuals like myself, like yourself, who have been in both areas,
are I find at times the villains in this story, right. The technology people don’t want them in
the conversation. I continue to be amazed in my current role, where it’s like, “Well you’re
not in technology.” I understand I’m not in technology, but to totally dismiss all of my prior
13, 14 years of technology experience because I’m now in the business is so short sighted
and foolish. (P2)
Collaboration and trust are required throughout, as highlighted in Figure 1 above. The participants
highlighted the importance of both to portfolio prioritization and development activities.
P1 shared the value of negotiation in the communication process, stressing that his voice
ensures there is “balance” and the needs of the business are balanced with IT priorities, so his firm
does not, “forget again about the opportunity cost of losing out on a customer” because IT won the
negotiation and priorities shifted. This negotiation is critical to success in the portfolio management
construct of the model, but also to the day-to-day building of technology, as daily priorities come to
drive value.
One of the most common sub-themes shared by the participants is the importance of clarity
as it relates to vision, requirements, and success metrics. As P1 explained, clarity is important
because the details hold the “gotchas or some of the pitfalls” that can really get a project in trouble.
And sponsors feel they are “obviously clear enough to get the funding” so “we’re good to go, but
that’s just not the case because there are so many details” that can lead to problems and need to be
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clarified. Clarity is critical to the model as it plays a central role in appreciating technical debt, its
cost, and the debt’s eventual impact to business value.
Silos are the final dependence upon which IT decisions are impacted. Research has proven
that having fewer silos improves decision-making. One of the products native to a large complex
organization is silos. Both participants shared experiences regarding silos. P1 summed it up very
well:
… it tends to be very siloed from a business architect perspective, you get caught up in your
own world, maybe not meaning to but the focus is the problem at hand and not always the
bigger picture and if you’re not proactively communicating with others from a broader
picture perspective, or if you’re not being told from above to communicate at that broader
level, it gets overlooked, and we run across that challenge a lot; siloed thinking. (P1)
Siloed structure and behavior put up invisible walls that stifle discovery and problem solving. Silos
impact every aspect of the model as they can cause problems with the portfolio management
process, technical development of solutions, absorption of change within a business, and
measurement of business value. Limited understanding resulting from artificial walls reduces
performance. They also contribute to information asymmetry as information has a harder time
breaking through the invisible behavioral walls of a silo.
External Customer Influence
One of the participants currently leads a product team at a software company. He shared the
relative influence customers have when you are in the business of selling them technology. The
dynamics are much different when software and hardware aren’t being sold. As P2 explained,
decisions to take on technical debt are a primary result of the influence customers have on internal
technology decisions. He shared,
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… there are tradeoffs made every day to your point, for the client needs A, B, and C by this
date and well, we have to organizationally build that six months after said date, but if you
don’t build it by that point, you aren’t going to get the contract. So, we make tradeoffs every
single day because we don’t want to walk away from a multi-million-dollar opportunity. So,
technology has to bear the brunt of doing it now and having to undo it six months later or
redo it or patch it up later. (P2)
In addition to clients, P2 explained that external partners influence internal technology
decisions. He shared the following explanation:
When you think about big platforms and big data, we are not doing it ourselves, we are
working with industry partners, which has its own challenges, they go belly up, they get
bought, they do something different, they change their pricing model and you’ve relied upon
a particular pricing structure as an OEM 2 reseller, if they sell their pricing or structure, it’s
going to have material impact on how you turn around and price the product you are selling
to customers. And we have lived that my entire two-and-a-half years where if you are heavily
reliant upon a piece of technology, think about technical debt. If you are relying upon a
particular technology to power your platform, those vendors might say, “wait a minute,” I
can change the pricing structure and you kind of don’t have much of a choice if you built
your platform totally coupled with me. And that’s for the technologist to think through the
implications three years down the road when this contract renews, will we be in a position
where if we don’t like the pricing or parameters working with a partner, we can say ‘no’ and
walk away and quickly transition tech without impacting services you’ve committed to with
your broader book of clients … that’s challenging. (P2)

2

OEM is an acronym commonly understood by IT professionals that means original equipment manufacturer. These
companies produce the original parts used to build a product as opposed to those only built for use as replacements.
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The challenges of incorporating external stakeholder considerations compound already complex
internal dynamics. This complexity impacts the model throughout, from rationalizing the portfolio,
to making development decisions and absorbing technical debt, to ensuring the organization
understands the changes to internal business and effectively adapts, to finally communicating how
external influences impacted the quantitative and qualitative value of the firm when income
attribution is computed.
Organizational Dynamics
Skill and domain competency were the most referenced dependences. These two variables
play a critical role in every IT decision. From the line worker to the C-suite, technical knowledge and
domain competency dominate decision-making dynamics. Regarding domain knowledge and
technical competency, P1’s experience formed his belief that, “if I am a business architect and I can’t
speak in terms of the technologists that I’m working with and vice versa, then we are going to have
challenges right off the bat.” He later elaborated,
… when it comes to technology projects if you can’t communicate effectively, just like you
said, it’s the person that can sell the dream will get the funding, well if you can’t
communicate after the dream is sold, you need someone to translate that to the technologists
so that’s just not a given that that will happen and I think that’s where a lot of firms get into
trouble, they just think that’s a given. (P1)
P2’s experience reinforced P1’s view as he shared,
In the retail business, it was amazing to me that nobody actually understood the hand raise
to cash. A customer says I want to sign up and buy from you. Nobody understood how that
hand raised or tracked that that hand raised actually resulted in money in the bank 60 days
later. It was incredible to me that you couldn’t find a single soul in the biz that understood
that process. (P2)
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In addition to skill and domain competency, P2 discussed leadership maturity. He referenced
an experience where he perceived a lack of leadership maturity and the CEO reacted, stepped into a
project, and “bl[ew] up that whole orchestration.” He continued to explain that, “it takes some really
confident mature individuals to step back and assess.” His assessment of the problem is that he
thinks,
… there are a lot of individuals who say, “this isn’t what I signed up for in my career,” it’s a
lot easier to come in every day, do what I do, go home, manage some people, feel good, I
don’t want to fire anybody because that’s a lot harder to deal with. (P2)
Finally, P2 stressed the importance of collocating people when they are working on projects.
This he viewed as creating “a level of teaming and trust and frankly, the first thing to get others to
work together—who may report to other people—toward a common objective.”
Organizational dynamics play out throughout the model. This research exposes deep and
varied skills: competencies and personalities are compounding factors that make the already
extremely complex problem of making good technical decisions every day even harder.
Architectural Influence
While P1 shared that he had not experienced the influence of architectural standards in his
current business role, he did share a challenge related to architectural influence. He mentioned that,
“a lot of technical debt is wrapped up in aging technology” and “sometimes you have to make sure it
fits with aging technology and sometimes it’s a very big challenge”. He continued to explain that it
comes down to competing for budget. I perceive this to be strongly related to a lack of architectural
standards and a roadmap, although this is not corroborated by empirical evidence. P2 was extremely
candid in sharing his view of technology architects as he finds,
… most information architects have never actually lived or walked a day in the shoes of
anybody that has to make money so they are able to kind of sit back on the sidelines and
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wait for people to make decisions and then jump in like the armchair quarterback and say
“that was a really stupid decision, why did you do it that way?” (P2)
He expressed wonder about why architects were not involved at the beginning of projects, implying
that they are not offered an opportunity to weigh in early. He saw that their “lack of ability to give
us guidance on what to do is potentially impacting our ability to make money and if the cycle
continues, I won’t be here, you won’t be here, none of us will be here.” Both participants viewed
architectural influence as suffering from the “ivory tower” syndrome. The lack of strong
architectural guidance and success metrics influences the model in several ways, from implementing
suboptimal designs to failing to guide qualitative assessments of value when technology changes are
implemented.
Business Strategy
Both participants recognized business strategy as playing a key role in setting priorities. P1
shared a very positive experience with his firm highlighting, “strategic imperatives that haven’t
changed for us on the business side for at least three years, maybe four years, and they are very
solid.” He elaborated,
I mean, they are very basic and we’ve tried to hold true to those from a business perspective
and stay committed to that, so that’s been very helpful to orient my team around that
because sometimes it takes a little bit of time to orient a team, get their goals set up, get them
engaged in the right efforts, make sure they are touching the right projects and when those
longer term or those bigger imperatives stay consistent, it makes my job much easier from a
priority standpoint. (P1)
His experience with business strategy and the value he had derived from having clear and
consistent goals is in stark contrast to the impact IT strategy and goals have had on performance.
While the business strategy has been consistent and allowed him time to align to it, IT has moved
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aggressively and, “the big picture push right now is trying to move everything off of on-prem 3 into
the Cloud”. He explained,
I think some of that is a little bit short-sighted in that we haven’t even taken into account
some of our client’s wishes or even run things by them when there is potentially a risk of
losing business as a result of some of these technology decisions. (P1)
He stressed that, “there is a dialogue that needs to happen there that some pure technologists miss
out on from a TCO perspective.” He bluntly summarized that some IT decisions have, “zero to do
with” business goals.
P2 clarified the importance of strategy being followed by all levels of the organization. He
explained the impact when it is not, by clarifying, “these are the objectives, this the priority, this is
the order we are doing them in and if you have a process where the CEO can jump in and interject,
it blows up that whole orchestration.” While this certainly speaks to the communication variable, it
also highlights how important it is to get people marching in a specific direction and arriving before
changing destination. While this experience highlights the importance of business strategy to
maintaining focus once a strategy begins to be executed, strategy is most important during the upfront and continuing portfolio rationalization process.
IT Manager Motivation
Motivation was a theme that subtly surfaced through the coding process. References were
made to IT manager attitudes and, underlying the tension that existed between the participants and
their IT counterparts, I sensed there was different motivation. For example, in response to a
question asking how IT managers make objective decisions that may negatively impact their scope

3

“on-prem” or “ on-premises” is common IT jargon for software running on a company’s internal servers versus
being hosted in the cloud
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of responsibility or headcount, P2 explained it is important for a firm to have visibility into
performance, so decisions become less emotional. He said,
I think the first part of it is tracking and managing the work. So, if you don’t have some
mechanism to track, manage, and report out the work, then all this is irrelevant, right?
Because if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it, etc. (P2)
While this doesn’t provide a great deal of insight, it may be a primary contributor to P1’s dilemma
when IT priorities are misaligned with his business priorities—IT is motivated differently. P1
explained, “a lot of that technical debt is wrapped up in aging technology.” IT managers are more
motivated to upgrade aging technology than they are to support development of new applications
and functionality. In fairness, according to P1, “there is just no easy answer” to addressing
competing priorities and motivational dynamics. While this research did not garner enough evidence
to convince me that IT manager motivation is a strong influencer within the model, it was
convincing enough to include it as a variable, with the caveat that more exploration of this potential
phenomenon is required.
Governance and Valuation
The final variable identified through the coding process is governance and valuation. There
were several aspects of governance and valuation that were discussed by the participants. The three
with the most shared experience are financial, requirements management, and intangible value. The
general state of affairs is that neither participant has seen governance effectively drive good IT
investment decisions from initial portfolio rationalization through value harvesting. While neither of
them has experienced effective governance and valuation, they both recognize how challenging and
important they are.
Specifically, P1 highlighted the importance of understanding total cost of ownership when
making technology investment decisions. He explained that it requires
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… really getting into the details and looking under the covers with some of these
calculations. You can really sway a business person’s perspective of what is their opinion,
because that’s what it comes down to sometimes, what is the opinion of this TCO number
because it’s subjective. You can input a lot of variables into a specific cost or you could keep
them out and put them somewhere else. (P1)
He elaborated by explaining IT managers do not include “the opportunity cost of losing out on a
customer or having someone walk out the door because they are not happy.” P2’s experience
reinforced the point that financial governance is important because different roles will choose what
to include in the cost equation. In P2’s experience, even though everyone signs up for some
investments, as soon as people are asked to offer hard dollar savings or benefits, “every single sales
person pushes away from the table” and refuses to commit to incremental revenue. As is the case
with business strategy, governance and valuation are areas where there is a great deal of published
research. Unfortunately, it has not led to solving the business problem for praxis. Pulling together all
of the multidisciplinary research into a single model may force rationalization of all the work and an
assessment of its potential to solve business’s problem of making suboptimal IT investment
decisions.
Discussion
Through the interviews I was able to not only discover the variables, but I also moved to a
detailed understanding of the variables. This understanding led me to appreciate just how much
information asymmetry exists within organizations, as it relates to IT investment. In addition, we
discovered that technical debt is a type of information that constitutes much of the asymmetry.
While there is currently a lot of attention paid to and published literature focused on technical debt,
it is almost exclusively focused on software technical debt. This exploratory research led us to
believe that the definition of technical debt should be broadened. Technical debt should include the
35

suboptimal performance that is a product of the variables identified in this research not being
maximized as a whole when an assessment of IT value is made for individual technology
investments.
While both participants validated the model, it became clear early in both interviews and in
analyzing the coding of the transcripts that the model needs to be more detailed for it to effectively
drive research. There are many contributing constructs that need to be in included in the model in
order for it to adequately drive alignment and encourage engagement. As a start, the themes and
sub-groups listed in Table 5 above should be layered into the model.
In summary, the insights derived from the conduct of this research led to several
advancements in understanding. The first was the validation of and a specific path for improving the
model. Each construct of the model has significant depth in its complex definition, an abundance of
existing research, and unending, yet unexplored, experiences in practice. For the model to be
meaningfully communicated and eventually serve as a tool for assessing the business value of IT
investments, a supporting artifact is required to answer questions regarding how each piece of the
model reflects more nuanced aspects. For example, the experiences of both participants highlight
the need for consistent collaboration throughout the life of information technology investments.
While this would seem to be straightforward, in practice, a lack of collaboration and trust is very
common and has material negative impacts on firms. An artifact is required to clarify this influence
and frame how researchers and practitioners engage to better understand and improve performance.
Another example of required refinement is clarifying why Organizational Dynamics is broader than
Human Resource Dynamics.
Another advancement in understanding relates to communication. In the Methods section
above, the assumption was that material investments would require communication with the owner
of the investment throughout the IT investment-business value equation. However, this proved not
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to be the case. Communication almost immediately ceased after solutions were released. This is
revealing in a couple ways. First, realizing firm value either was not a driver for behavior or the
required value was perceived to have been achieved at “go-live.” The second interesting point arising
from this evidence is that for practice to participate with academia to improve performance, their
behavior and operating practices will have to change and will need to begin tracking technology
investments throughout the realization and validation of benefits. The need for longitudinal studies
is evident. Costs incurred as a result of changes to technology will also have to be tracked, as firms
may not discover any negative impacts until years after implementation. In addition, organizations
will not learn if they are not engaged in follow-up discussions after investments are delivered. This is
an opportunity to provide tools and/or a process to close this gap so that organizations can make
more informed decisions based upon prior performance of their IT investments.
A surprising finding was that architectural influence wasn’t universally believed to be a
primary driver for making the best business decisions. For example, P2 supported “slush funds” for
individual IT teams and business units/functions to do with as they please. Furthermore, while
communication was highlighted as critical to the success of portfolio management and development
activities, little experience was shared about the importance of communication during the process of
business change and value measurement. This lack of communication during benefits validation
could be a primary cause of business values of specific IT investments not being measured, reported,
or broadly acknowledged by firms.
Another interesting finding was that P2 stressed the importance of collocating people when
they are working on projects. This was unexpected, as P2 is a savvy user of technology and a
relatively young leader. I expected him to extol the value of virtual technology and the view that it
increases productivity. He did not, explaining, “I think collocation is really, really important.” The
recent news that a pioneer of the virtual office, IBM, is requiring all employees to physically be
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present in the office, as did Yahoo when CEO Marissa Mayer took control, implies that the studies
and business experts have gotten it wrong and that physical location is a key ingredient for success in
some firms. I expect that a great deal of research is already under way in order to understand this
recent change in the valuation of virtual vs. physical participation, and information asymmetry may
be one reason that collocation is important.
Finally, this exploratory research served to help formulate the problem. The scope of the
research project remained broad at this point and a second exploratory study was needed, using a
more targeted focus. To narrow the scope to the most interesting aspects of the initial findings, I
focused the next phase of research on the exploration of information asymmetry as it relates to IT
investment decisions.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
UNCOVERING EVIDENCE OF TECHNICAL DEBT AS A CLASS OF
INFORMATION
Introduction
The first step in problem formulation detailed in Chapter 4 informed my understanding of
the problem and led to the exploration of two concepts: information asymmetry and technical debt.
While technical debt did not emerge as strong a concept as information asymmetry, it was
referenced multiple times. The concept of information asymmetry was especially interesting as it
surfaced as a key finding from the interviews as a contributor to dysfunctional behavior during IT
investment decision-making and execution. It pointed my next phase of research toward discovering
more about the concept.
I performed an abbreviated literature review on the topics of information asymmetry and
technical debt. This review involved searches for each respective topic in Google Scholar by
relevance, reading the first thirty article abstracts for each, and reading the entire articles for a select
group that seemed most relevant to this research. As a nascent area of knowledge, technical debt
articles were searched based upon relevance AND being published since 2014.
Two articles proved especially useful. For information asymmetry, Akerlof’s (1978) seminal
paper informed my understanding of the problem and served as an anchor to which I could ground
the problem and this research study. The second article (Alves et al., 2016) defined 15 types of
technical debt that served as a taxonomy to which we could align the type of information
comprising the gaps we discovered in practice.
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Research Method
This second study was a continuation of the problem formulation stage of ADR. While my
first set of interviews provided a broad appreciation for the issues related to making poor IT
investment solutions, I had to pivot from the model I introduced as my area of focus was too broad.
Therefore, I designed a second set of interviews with a more targeted problem statement. My
second data collection effort sought to answer the following question:
RQ: 1. How do information asymmetries between business and IT affect IT investment
decisions?
Interviews were conducted with four leaders of IT investment, each responsible for
investment in excess of $100 million per annum. Their companies’ 2017 revenues ranged from $1.5
billion to $61 billion. In addition to being accountable for the execution of strategic IT investment
decisions, these executives were selected because they led areas that owned much of the information
that was leveraged to make strategic IT investment decisions. The interviews were semi-structured
and consisted of the questions listed in Appendix F. Semi-structured interview questions were
developed following the approach described by Merriam and Tisdell (2015), where “neither the
exact wording nor the order of the questions is determined ahead of time.” Merriam and Tisdell
(2015) explained that this approach “allows the researcher to respond to the situation at hand, to the
emerging worldview of the respondent, and to new ideas on the topic.” This approach could not
have been more appropriate for my data collection, as one of the participants had an unanticipated
response when he asserted that he did not have long-range planning data, that he only relied on oneyear plans, and that he rebuilds them each year. This was unanticipated: an executive accountable for
billions of dollars in annual information technology spending did not have plans longer than one
year in advance. If a highly structured interview approach had been employed, this insight may not
have surfaced, or at a minimum would not have been explored.
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All interviews were transcribed using a transcription service. Following the transcription of
interview text, software called QDA Miner was employed to qualitatively code the text, and an
approach outlined in Saldana (2015) and detailed in Auerbach and Silverstein (2003) was followed.
The coding method is called Elaborative Coding and it is a second cycle, also called top-down,
coding method.
This second cycle method of coding relied upon the previous coding from the first study as
a starting point for the second study’s coding. I leveraged the technical debt taxonomy (Alves et al.,
2016) to serve as the initial coding. While new themes emerged, to keep the scope of this research
project manageable, I only used the technical debt types and the text that mapped to them to
complete the formulation of the problem and inform the next phase of this research project.
Data Analysis
This phase of the research project identified gaps that are filled during the creation of an
instrument. This instrument is expected to help organizations reduce information asymmetry in IT
investment decision-making. The data collected in this second study provided empirical evidence
supporting the existence of information asymmetry comprised of nine of the 15 types of technical
debt defined by Alves et al. (2016), which are listed in Appendix A. Figure 6 illustrates the
concentration of evidence among the nine technical debt types.
Figure 7 illustrates the concentration mapping of the data collected by Alves et al. (2016) vs.
the data collected in this study. The evidence collected in this study was significantly concentrated in
four technical debt types: Requirement, Documentation, Infrastructure, and Architecture. Intuitively,
a significant variance in concentration was expected as academic research—the source of the
literature examined by Alves et al. (2016)—has primarily focused on debt accumulated during the
coding process within a software development project. Only recently has the term technical debt
been recognized as a metaphor for unplanned costs associated with information system changes that
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are not code-centered, e.g., people, requirement, infrastructure, etc. In addition, in January 2018, Bill
Curtis, Executive Director of CISQ, acknowledged, “Industry defines technical debt differently than
academia” (Curtis, 2018). CISQ is the Consortium for Software Quality and was co-founded in 2010
by Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute and OMG.

Figure 6. Concentration of coded text within the technical debt taxonomy.
Study 1 - Litereature Mapping (Taxonomy Defined)
TD Type
Total
Design
42
Architecture
30
Documentation
28
Test
24
Code
21
Defect
17
4
Requirement
Infrastructure
3
People
3
Test automation
3
Process
3
Build
2
Service
2
Usability
2
Versioning
1

Study 2 - Interview Quotes (Elaborative Coding)
TD Type
Total
Design
Architecture
Documentation
Test
Code
Defect
Requirement
Infrastructure
People
Test automation
Process
Build
Service
Usability
Versioning

Figure 7. Alves et al.’s (2016) results versus this study’s elaborative coding results.
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1
9
19
2
0
1
26
11
1
0
0
1
0
0
0

Discussion
Several key findings were discovered. For example, there is a gap in the information available
to senior executives in IT about the amount of technical debt being incurred. In addition, the
interviews highlighted a number of other sources of information asymmetry within IT. As one CIO
stated, he doesn’t have a roadmap, and instead relies on the direct reports that provide him with the
priorities entering each year. He also does not track the multi-year effects of prior year investments.
In addition to discovery, the analysis resulted in identifying the data collected in this effort that
aligned to a subset of the 15 types of technical debt defined by Alves et al. (2016).
In summary, the findings from this data collection, coding, and analysis informed my design
of the next phase of this research project: solution creation. To this end, the data collected in this
phase were mapped to the types of technical debt and were used to design an artifact that would
serve as a solution to the problem of information asymmetry negatively impacting initial strategic IT
investment decisions. Much of the analysis of the data collected in this phase of the research project
is detailed in Chapter 6, as the line between problem formulation and design was crossed somewhere
between completing the coding and analyzing the coding. The completed artifact that lists the
coding of data from this study serves as the last artifact supporting the problem formulation.
Following the coding, analysis of the coding generated questions that served as the first content for
the design of an instrument that was intended to solve the problem.
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CHAPTER SIX:
TAKING ACTION TO REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY:
INSTRUMENT CREATION
Introduction
The evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with leaders that have participated in IT
investment decisions within large complex organizations informed the creation of an instrument that
could reduce the amount of information asymmetry between stakeholders during the execution of
initial strategic IT investment decisions. This instrument was planned to serve as a source of
potential debt items to be tracked after implementation. An elaborated action design research
(eADR) approach was employed to co-create the instrument in praxis. The introduction of an
instrument to capture technical debt information is expected to bring to light hidden costs that, if
known, may influence decision-making.
Strategic IT investment decisions are reviewed and approved by the most senior executives
in an organization. Figure 8 illustrates the typical high-level initial strategic IT investment decisionmaking process followed by large complex organizations.

Figure 8. High-level process of making an initial strategic IT investment decision.
An exploratory study was conducted to understand how IT and business communicated during the
IT investment decision-making process within large complex organizations (see Chapter 4). Two
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practitioners with the unique perspective of having had roles as business leaders AND as IT leaders
within different large complex firms were selected for the study. The exploratory research revealed
that significant information asymmetry exists between IT and business when making strategic IT
investment decisions.
A second study was conducted to discover the types of information that comprise the
asymmetry (see Chapter 5). Four IT executives at different large complex firms—accountable for
the IT information shared with a strategic IT investment committee—were interviewed. The
transcribed interviews were coded using an Elaborative Coding methodology, described by Saldaña,
(2015), as a second cycle method. A second cycle method is used to elaborate upon a previous study.
The previous study leveraged for this work was published in a top-tier journal. The article defined 15
types of technical debt. These technical debt types were used as codes for the second study to
explore the possibility that they may serve as a classification or taxonomy for the evidence collected.
The third phase of this research project sought to build an instrument that would close the
information asymmetry that exists during the strategic IT investment decision-making process. To
this end, an instrument was created that details the questions to be answered in order to close the
information asymmetry associated with the relevant technical debt types. The balance of this chapter
describes the creation and evaluation of the instrument.
Initial Instrument Design
The four technical debt types with the largest number of coded interview quotes from the
research in Chapter 5 were selected to constitute the initial design of the instrument. They had
significantly more supporting data than the other five types. The goal of the instrument is to reduce
information asymmetry, with the expectation that more informed decisions lead to better outcomes.
The steps followed to create the initial version of the instrument include:
1. Identify the goal of the instrument
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2. Select a definition for each type of technical debt
3. Analyze coded transcripts and identify themes informed by consensus—this was
done independently for each of the four types of technical debt
4. Design questions expected to reduce information asymmetry related to the themes
The definitions for each type of technical debt (step two) were taken from Alves et al. (2016) and are
listed in Appendix A. An example of steps three and four is best understood by reading the
“Question Derivation – Example” section and reviewing the analysis in Table 2 below, which
identifies the subtypes of information used to generate questions for the Requirements Debt section
of the artifact. The questions were designed to close the type of information summarized by the
subtype classification.
Question Derivation – Example
The creation of the questions was informed by consensus themes that surfaced in coded data
from Chapters 4 and 5. An example of coded comments that were translated into questions is listed
in Table 2. The Requirement Debt coding was used to create subtypes of codes in the right-hand
column of Table 2, which served as a basis for formulating questions. The questions were derived
from applying my experience in practice as a participant in the IT investment decision-making
experience to the coded comments and creating questions that were targeted at reducing the
Requirement Debt information asymmetry. No formal process was followed for this exercise; the
researcher simply interpreted the comments, classified them into subtypes, and formulated
questions. The initial set of questions served as the baseline content for the instrument. The first
version of the instrument is provided in Appendix I.
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Table 2
Summary information gaps

Coded Comments (Participant ID, Comment Number)
what is the impact to our people and business processes (P2, 4)
then you are relying on the technologists to understand the business
process (P1, 3)
on the technology side there isn't really anybody that understands what
the business is trying to do from a broad perspective (P1, 6)
It was incredible to me that you couldn't find a single soul in the business
that understood that process (P2, 16)
there are so many details, there are so many things that if you don’t
know some of the gotcha’s or some of the pitfalls, you really can get in
trouble from a project perspective (P1, 19)
If I see processes not well documented, I'm putting a big red flag up (P3,
303)
And at each level, I guess the details becomes less, and the abstraction
becomes greater. So once you get to the CEO level, we're probably
looking at things more like the investment categories (P4, 402)
we've just realized we do like reporting to the Brazilian Central Bank from
it, and we weren't factored into the plans (P4, 408)
people get bullied by the business into doing whatever the business want
to do. And like you say, you wake up one morning in five years' time
realizing that there are a lot of things that should have been done along
the way, and now you've got a massive legacy problem (P4, 419)
nobody seemed to be accountable for looking down the road more than
one year (P5, 502)
how many departments do you have to include to actually pull off a piece
of work? That was not formalized in any sort of database (P5, 507)

Requirement Debt Information Gaps
Process Impact
Process Impact
Enterprise Impact
Process Impact
General Details (Interpreted primarily as
data and process impacts)
Process Impact

Complete Lack of Detailed Information
Data and Process Impact

General Requirement Impact
Medium to Long-Term Requirement Impact
Enterprise Impact (Also Documentation
Debt)

There's a consensus that there's not really a need to spend the overhead
in trying to evaluate what's right because they all are in such violent
agreement about "We need this, we need this, we need this (P6, 603)
Lack of Detailed Requirements
What we've had to do in the case of the retail business is build an entire
product management function whose job it is to solicit the ideas of all the
different variations because invariably what we'd get is, we'd have one
expert FA tell us "This is absolutely what we need as a group and if we
don't have this we're going to go out of business." And then we'd have
another expert advisor, just as accomplished, say the opposite (P6, 607)
the sum of the parts of what people agree need to get done and funded,
is more than what the CEO's willing to fund. We in IT try to put that
burden back on the business to arbitrate and to decide what not to fund
(P6, 609)
Even in cases where they are collaborating, I think it is plausible in
circumstances where the domain is not well understood, that even with
best efforts and best communication, there's just a general lack of
familiarity with depth of the problem (P6, 613)
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Competing Requirements

Requirement Feasibilty Not Vetted Against
Technology

Process and Data Impact

Iterative Design – Cycle One
Following the initial design of the instrument, the content was introduced to a practitioner to
engage in practice-centered design. The list of six participants from both sets of interviews was
reviewed and the participant identified for participation in the iterative design of the instrument was
selected due to his distinct roles, listed below:
1. Chair of the strategic IT investment committee within IT
2. Owner of the content provided to the investment committee within IT
3. Owner of the IT investment decision-making process within IT
4. Owner of the content supplied by IT to the enterprise strategic IT investment
committee
This professional was the only participant fulfilling all four of these roles, thereby providing
unique insight into the entire strategic IT investment decision-making ecosystem. His organization
invested approximately $750 million in technology spending in each of the years 2013-2017.
For the initial review of the instrument’s proposed content, the practitioner was shown the
first page of the instrument. This step aligned with entry into the ADR process at the design stage,
what is termed an Objective Centered entry point by Mullarkey and Hevner (2018). The discussion
with the participant focused on what a better artifact would accomplish. The practitioner-researcher
discussion included assessing the feasibility of building and using such an artifact. The discussion
revealed how this artifact would complement current artifacts employed by practice. I consciously
limited the supporting quotes for each type of technical debt and only included one from the
participant for this phase of the research. This was done to ensure the evidence resonated and the
examples provided were validated from an independent standpoint with a detached objectivity.
Using the participant’s quotes may have muddied the context and prevented the required focus on
the design activity, as he may have become distracted reliving experiences in his mind. Appendix I
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includes the content reviewed with the participant. The bracketed text after each quote was not
provided to the participant for review; instead, it was added to this dissertation to provide support
for the appropriateness of the quote for the type of technical debt.
Table 3
Results of first practitioner-researcher design iteration

Content Area
Selected Feedback
Instrument Overview I know that my company, they're kind of looking at test
automation, DevOps, and just a complete investment in
automation as a silver bullet...That stuck out to me right away
and I believe that if you automate something that still doesn't
have architecture documentation or design you're just
propagating a problem faster.

Discussion Led to Agreement of Content Modification Added To:
Add
Architecture Debt
Does this investment have a test automation and/or DevOps
component? If so, when is the automation and DevOps
design planned as it relates to the major milestones of the
investment?

Requirement Debt

I think if your instrument, maybe need a bit of an enterprise
architecture view in terms of capabilities, how they start off
with the drivers and the goals and the capabilities that the
firm needs to have, and how these investments are
contributing to those capabilities on a master view.

Add
Requirement Debt
What are the enterprise-level drivers for this investment?
What are the enterprise-level capabilities that will be enhanced
as a result of this investment? What is the source of the
definition and management of the capabilities?

Infrastructure

What I'm thinking is that I think there's probably facets of
these that you'll get answers for right away, particularly if it's a
software system. It'll be talking about the functionality of the
software system but those people won't care about if it's
running on this type of network or network equipment, down
to the switches and routers and storage and the other stuff
that really can be tremendously impactful to the overall
execution performance of the system. I guess what I'm trying
to say is that most times those systems are made up with
software and then you got storage, compute, CPU and all
those types of things. Those things are just, "Oh, that's the IT
stuff and infrastructure stuff that somebody else handles,"
and you've got to look at the complete picture.

Add
Which type of technologies comprise the in-scope switches,
routers and storage? How will this investment alter the
profile of these technologies and instantiation of the
infrastructure architecture?

Infrastructure
Debt

Infrastructure

It's too complicated and it's too early. I would say that a lot of
these big investments are being made before any designs can
be done. Well how can I tell you what the impact to storage is
when you haven't even designed it yet? Right? And it's almost
like the investment cycle itself is too compressed in a short
amount of time with a bunch of assumptions, right? And I
can appreciate that you have to start there but you can't leave
it there.

Add
When did you begin preparing this investment proposal?
How much time do you need to adequately identify the
information required from the questions comprising this
instrument?

Instructions

Architecture

Yeah, checking with a party, independent third party. Maybe Add
Architecture Debt
not ... it's an independent third party is good but also your
Have our technology partners provided a thorough review of
partners. They're not independent because they have the
the proposal?
material investment in your success [inaudible 00:39:19]
vendor but you shouldn't discount that because it's not third
party, right? You know what I mean.....I mean I would say in
a particular way, that resonates with a lot of IT executives is,
"Look, I've been spending millions of dollars with Cisco for
years and years. I have to trust them. Or what kinds of saps
are we?" You got to value their opinion.

Documentation

Right. And some of the questions I think you should be
Add
asking in this section ...in terms of producing documentation Does this investment impact lower levels of technology that
so that you can understand the systems and the impacts is
people normally assume are going to be there?
you got to ask those questions. Well how does it effect the
lower levels of technology that people normally assume are
just going to be there?

Architecture Debt

The iterative design consisted of two rounds of review and discussion. Each iteration
included design, implementation, and evaluation. Implementation and evaluation were simulated for
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reasons explained in Chapter 3. The first review included introducing each section of the instrument
included in Appendix I separately, by asking the participant to read the section. Once he had read
the section, some context was provided, and the following open-ended question was asked to solicit
feedback: “What are your thoughts?” The iterative discussion about the content led to
recommendations for changes in the content, listed in Table 3 below. Table 3 includes the cocreated changes to the instrument content believed to provide actionable insights to improve the
instrument based upon the participant’s expertise. The dialogue for this first round of review during
this design session lasted 43 minutes. The conversation was recorded and transcribed. The
transcription was used to validate handwritten notes taken by the researcher.
Following the initial review of each section of the content, the participant was asked to
review the content again and to consider a recent investment decision that would have been altered
had he employed the instrument. He identified a situation and his feedback included the following.
[We were] talking about moving in the cloud. And in order for us to move the cloud, what
do we need to? What capabilities do we need to have to actually make that happen? That was
all done at buzz word level…In order to really make that happen, we had to invest in
automation, DevOps, and probably Agile. We got to change our networks. We have to have
a culture change. We have to have people [with expertise] we don’t have … just because you
were a good engineer on-prem doesn’t mean you’re instantly a good engineer in the cloud.
The availability of outside expertise and things. Those are all important things.
For example, the cloud transformation thing was a $12 million investment and it was like,
“They’ll take care of everything.” Well wait a minute, we can’t take care of automation across
the entire company. We can’t take care of Agile across the entire company. We can’t take
care of resilience. That’s another big one. Cloud has to be resilient. Someone’s like, ‘there’s
somebody that’s in charge of resilience and disaster recovery and things like that. But they
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have other concerns. They’re concerned about other things and there’s things like resilience
[that] is not something that a cloud component can take care of by itself. It’s the application
that’s using cloud components that has to be done resilient versus the underlying
infrastructure. None of those things were understood and so you got into it until they hit a
brick wall and said, “Wait a minute. We can’t do tier one [applications].” There’s a lot of
reasons why we can’t do tier one. But the going in assumption was we could. But there’s just
a lot of hand waving and a lot of assumptions being made that they’ll figure it out. And that’s
where, that’s again, if you start off with not understanding what the entire enterprise looks
like, and what are all the different capabilities that are required to do something, you can’t
even put together a good plan.
Well, that’s how their business cases get approved too. “Well, Mr. CIO, I mean, we’ve got to
do cloud, right?” “Oh yeah, we’ve got to do cloud.” “Sign the check.” Without
understanding what that really means. Which application, specifically, are you talking about?
Right? And is there a roadmap for that portfolio of applications.
Following the explanation of how the instrument would have improved a recent investment
decision, the participant was asked why he thinks executives did not make the right decision despite
probably being smart people. He explained that,
I think it’s such a hard thing to conceptualize. There’s so many details, so many
dependencies that when you’re trying to make an investment decision in a 6-week period of
time, July every year, you don’t have time to do all of that analysis. Somebody will figure it
out. I think that’s the default position. I think the other thing too is not just understanding
kind of what your current state is. That’s a big thing. I would say most companies don’t
understand what their current state is in terms of what their capabilities are, how old their
equipment is, in an easy to understand wall chart. You know what I mean? A poster. Say,
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“Oh, okay. We’re talking about this over here. We’re talking about this application over here
that uses this storage, this many mainframes.” Ideally this is something that is always
maintained, always available. But when you start figuring out what the impacts are to the
proposed investment, to that infrastructure, that needs to start earlier in that little window
where everybody has to put together their business cases.
Yeah, and it’s so frustrating. And they also don’t understand what goes wrong either. They
make the assumptions that this is a good investment and when it goes wrong, they also can’t
understand what goes wrong. It’s pretty ridiculous. But I can appreciate where you get into a
position where you just have to make a decision, with the best available data, and the best
available data is pretty weak most times.
While the participant was able to evaluate the instrument’s utility by articulating the cloud
situation and the impact of information asymmetry due to not having the necessary information to
make a better decision, he also shared one of the reasons that it is challenging. He believes that
executives struggle to gain an appreciation for all relevant data because it is not maintained and
because CIOs and CTOs have an average duration in their jobs of, “two to four years or something
like that.” While this statistic has not been validated, if his experience is remotely consistent with the
actual numbers, it is easy to see why executives who do not work within IT are disadvantaged. This
is due to extreme information asymmetry, if key technical people are rotating out when they gain any
depth of understanding in the company’s technology. The leaders they depend on to provide them
with technical information have not been around that long. This key reflection and learning
informed the next iteration of the instrument design and creation. One final point of note involves
an observation regarding the participant’s body language—leaning forward—and tone of his voice:
they led me to believe he was genuinely excited about the content.
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Following the documentation and review of the feedback received during the first review of
the instrument, each of the points in Table 2 were discussed with the participant during a follow-up
phone call. This validation of content included a back-and-forth dialogue. While the review did not
immediately yield additional recommended modifications to the questionnaire, several insights were
surfaced, which are expected to improve the effectiveness of the instrument. The primary insight
discovered during this round of design was the identification of a new gap: a lack of identification of
strategic capabilities that strategic IT investment decisions must affect. While stated in varying ways
from the participant throughout our interaction, the following comments from him summarize the
point:
… you hear automation as a buzz word, “Hey, let’s make an investment in
automation,” but oftentimes that’s where the discussion ends and, “Oh, the IT
people will figure it out.” Really, there’s a driver there. Somebody in their head,
either implicitly or explicitly has said, “Hey, we’ve got to deliver things faster, more
reliably.” It has to have an audit trail, an automated audit trail of everything that was
going on with these systems. Reduce mistakes, reliability, repeatability, and all those
types of things. That’s what people are thinking in their head, but they never write
that down and they never tie it to a specific example of, “Hey, our customers on the
street are always complaining that it takes us a year to add three fields to a CSCI
screen somewhere.” Those become the drivers and the requirements.
Okay, but now when it comes to [invest in] IT, okay, we’re talking about automation.
What do we actually need to do? What capabilities do we have? Well, we have
capabilities at the point of testing of building infrastructure and things like that. How
are we as far as automation goes across those IT capabilities? If you get a RAG [Red,
Amber, Green] status on them, “Well, we’re red here,” meaning it’s ad-hoc. “Yellow
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here,” there’s some automation, “green here,” it’s fully automated. That’s what I
mean. There’s kind of a landscape of why are we doing it and kind of [with] what
capabilities, and those capabilities are kind of a simplistic view of the business
capabilities, plus the actual logical and technical implementation of those capabilities,
right?
When these folks are making investment decisions, a lot of times they have the
discussion one on one with this sponsor or this interested party and then they move
over here and talk to this sponsor and this interested party, but without the map that
ties it all together, “Hey, wait a minute. You guys are talking about, at least in part,
the same thing,” and so there’s overlap there.
While I have incorporated questions that attempt to discover enterprise drivers and
capabilities into the superordinate version of the instrument in Appendix J, more research is
required to flesh out the phenomena. For example, how can organizations design an effective set of
enterprise drivers and capabilities with measures to drive investment at lower levels? This may
ultimately result in an enhanced version of the instrument, although it may warrant a discrete
instrument with a broader goal (see Chapter 7).
In summary, while having perfect information is not possible due to extremely high costs,
combined with the fluid nature of evolving information system instantiations, the following
statement from the participant captures the need to do better:
… there is a bare minimum level of information that you do have to know in order to make
the right decision. You don’t need to catalog the blackberries and the mice and keyboards
and stuff like that, but you do need to understand—intimately—your major platforms, your
major big pieces of software and hardware….
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The goal of this instrument is to improve this understanding, primarily at the executive level to
ensure more informed strategic IT investment decisions are made.
These more informed decisions could only reasonably be made if this new information to be
included in business cases is captured and maintained on an ongoing basis. As the participant
explained,
… and that’s the point you should make about the architecture debt and the documentation
debt and things like that is that stuff needs to live on beyond the people. Right? When the
new person comes in, are they going to start from scratch learning all that stuff? Or do you
have that continuum.
Iterative Design – Cycle Two
The second iteration of the design of the instrument was conducted with the same
participant that took part in the first design iteration. This final design session approached the design
exercise by asking the participant to review the instrument line-by-line and offer his view of each
line of content. This design session took 122 minutes. It was recorded and transcribed. The version
of the instrument reviewed during this session is included in Appendix G.
The primary product of this design phase is included as Appendix H. The changes detailed
in Appendix H were made to the instrument and the final version of the artifact is included in
Appendix J. Due to the nature of this artifact being a static document to complement a process that
already exists in practice, there was no formal line between the design and build phases of eADR.
When the design was complete, the artifact had been built. This is akin to an agile software
development process, where pieces of the software are delivered and tested as design continues to
unfold.
The questions designed for the instrument are expected to add information to a business
case that is not typically included when making strategic IT investment decisions. The answers to the
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questions for each type of technical debt serve as a treatment. The research approach employed
designed and simulated implementation by asking, “What is your reflection of using the 24 questions
and how would it have affected your decision?” The hypothesis is as follows:
H0:

If information on technical debt is added to the business case, better strategic IT
investment decisions are made.

I tested the hypothesis by:
1. Constructing an instrument
2. Picking an example strategic IT investment decision
3. Simulating introduction of technical debt information using the instrument
4. Modifying the instrument
5. Evaluating the modified instrument
Evidence in the form of the participant’s evaluation includes two examples of reflection
where the participant identified prior strategic IT investment decisions that did not result in
expected value. He explained that if this instrument had been used and the information asymmetry
had been reduced as a result, better outcomes would have occurred. The first investment involved
1,600 AIX servers that were not kept current. This infrastructure debt was not discussed until it was
too late. The impact was not only a delay in another strategic investment. Due to the amount of
money that needed to be spent in the current budget to cover the unplanned upgrade, the
organization was unable to fund several growth investments. The participant explained,
… my favorite example is upgrading AIX in the middle of a broader program which was to
completely eliminate AIX and move to virtual Linux. Because they hadn’t, because they
weren’t planning and maintaining the overall age of the major platforms within the stack,
they found themselves painted into a corner where they had to upgrade 1,600 AIX servers in
the midst of a plan that was actually decommissioning those servers.
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He continued, “They found themselves at a point where they couldn’t even make a decision
anymore. They just had to do it.” The participant elaborated on the impact by explaining the
strategic IT investment decision-making process at his firm. He explained,
… suppose you are our CIO and you have 20 investments coming to the table to be put in,
right? Any one of those investments that was planning on leveraging AIX and they get to the
aging question and they get to the architecture question that’s going to, right then and
there that would’ve caught it.
This evidence reveals that employing the artifact would have resulted in a better strategic IT
investment decision. Prior year investments would have uncovered the aging of these servers and
forced prioritization earlier, as long-range strategic plans to migrate to Linux were being discussed.
The participant further validated the value the instrument would have provided by stating, “Yeah,
they would have said, ‘Hey, wait a minute before we commit ourselves to five more years of being
on this platform. Is there a way that we can change this investment to instead build it on Virtual
Linux?’” Every investment that did not discover the plan to migrate off of AIX assumed it would
just be there, and the parties involved continued to design and build their solutions to run on AIX.
In addition, the impact on other investments was compounded, because now they all have to
upgrade and there are limited opportunities to do so in a year. For example, weekends are required
for enterprise disaster recovery exercises, which consume many of the weekends available for other
investments. Therefore, they have to push out all the delivery dates for their investments that are
now saddled with upgrading AIX.
The second validation of the instrument’s value involved a strategic IT investment his firm
made to move to the cloud. He explained,
The example that I would’ve used would’ve been cloud where in moving major workloads to
the cloud, people made the assumption that if you were an expert in on-prem technology
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such as a database or something, that automatically you’re an expert in cloud database. And I
think that the timing and the investments and people would’ve been much different had that
been understood ahead of time. It also would have caused them to think well, who is going
to do this work. And in reality, what happened was we got in a situation where they’re trying
to put tier one applications into the cloud and realized that they didn’t know how they were
going to solve some fundamental problems like resiliency and things like that. And there’s a
lot of trial and error and experimentation and a lot of money wasted. Versus bringing in the
right architects and the right engineers ahead of time to put together a plan that actually
would’ve gotten them to the right place.
Yeah… cloud would’ve been a big one, right? And it would’ve been a big one because some
people have the notion that “hey, we’re going to save a lot of money by moving to the
cloud.” And there were a lot of assumptions about hey, we can shut down our data centers
by moving to cloud. We can save $80 to $120 million a year in the bill of IT by moving to
the cloud. And because a lot of this homework wasn’t done, they found it just easier to not
methodically plan a migration from the data center SYS ID by SYS ID [system ID] but to
instead take an opportunistic approach, hey just whoever is ready to move to the cloud, let’s
let them. Let’s publish a cloud first policy and then let’s just let applications whenever they
have a reason to upgrade or something let’s have them upgrade to the cloud. And the impact
of that was you’re no longer looking at the total cost of ownership of your on-prem
investment, but you now have kind of shifted to a new driver or benefit which was agility. I
can do it faster. I don’t have to wait for those infrastructure folks to build my environments.
I can build them myself on the cloud. Your expense base went up. There was a lot of
thrashing on even figuring out how to make it work. And yeah, at the end of the day, you’re
just so far away from actually saving, lowering the bill of IT.
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He summed it up by clarifying the value the instrument would have had: “So thinking it all the way
through. And being consistent. And not just assuming that magic will happen is a big part of it. I
think it’s a pretty good example.”
An important additional learning that occurred during reflection on the artifact and
employing it included the participant explaining how he would use the instrument. He shared, “I
would probably provide it to them ahead of time, but it would require interviews and probing
questions.” He elaborated by highlighting the need for the “right person” to conduct the probing
interviews to populate the instrument. He shared the following when asked who the right person is.
Well, I think it would be multiple people. I think it would be probably like CTO or
somebody down a level from the CTO that’s actually familiar with where they spend their
money, what platforms and stuff. So, it’d be someone like that and it would also be probably
somebody from like the BMOs, business management offices. It would be somebody from
architecture. Yeah, so I think it’s a representative from the technology side and the business,
the IT business side. In other words, how much do our services cost? That person and then
the architect, which is the person that’s saying what technology we are using and how to
rationalize that and how it makes sense. So, I guess those are the two main interest groups.
Evidence of perceived information asymmetry reduction comprising four types of technical
debt will improve the strategic IT investment decision-making process. Engagement with practice
resulted in the participant favorably perceiving the value of the instrument.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Contributions
In answering both high-level research questions posed in Chapter 2, this research
contributed to practice and knowledge in multiple ways. Primarily for practice, it delivered an
instrument that improves strategic IT investment decisions. It also revealed consistent behavior
across several large complex firms, where information asymmetry negatively impacts not only
strategic IT investment decisions, but also other types of decisions, and stunts the maturation
process of organizations. Finally, it identified the need for a process where information collected via
the instrument is regularly maintained, not only to ensure it is shared and included in decisionmaking, but also to impact non-strategic investments. If relevant parties were made aware of this
information, they would likely also make better decisions. The information collected through the
instrument serves to identify and quantify the contingent liability that exists, which is not effectively
understood, let alone managed, by large complex firms.
This research project has also made several contributions to knowledge. First, it broadened
the application of information asymmetry to a new domain; information technology. This may open
avenues for research across domains, as information asymmetry occurs wherever humans are
required to make joint decisions. This research applied it in a novel way and provided a solution.
This research serves as evidence supporting the relatively new body of knowledge known as
elaborated action design research. It may be the first research project to employ a hybrid
ADR/eADR method. I recommend using this approach of transitioning methodology from ADR to
eEDR when researchers discover they will not be able to implement a solution within a reasonable
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period of time. Publishing findings prior to completing solution implementation and evaluation may
prove to advance knowledge more rapidly than waiting. Finally, this research provided evidence to
support the recently defined types of technical debt (Alves et al., 2016). In addition, the evidence
reveals an even broader definition and provides examples that define broader definitions for four of
the 15 types of technical debt.
Discovering the drivers for information gaps between the business and IT was a
contribution practice could leverage. Organizations are now aware of the materiality of the impact
these gaps have on their ability to communicate effectively.
Limitations
Due to the small number of participants, there is a risk that the findings from this study are
not generalizable. However, the complementary findings from coded transcripts of all six
participants found no outliers when it came to formulating the problem. In addition, until the
instrument is put into practice and empirical evidence is gathered to reveal its performance, the
relative value of the instrument is not known.
Recommendations for Future Research
One natural extension of this research is to investigate the strategic IT investment decisions
that occur throughout the life of an investment, i.e., beyond the initial investment decision that was
the focus of this dissertation. For example, strategic IT investments have opportunities to
“renegotiate” their terms; perhaps applying what Roberts’ (2015) discovered about renegotiation
behavior in financial contracting would benefit IT investments. Another area of research that may
prove fruitful is budgetary slack, which is extensively discussed within the accounting field where
Van der Stede’s (2000) study of the effects of managerial short-term orientation as it relates to
budgetary slack may support targeting the short-term effects that incentivize “sellers” highlighted in
this dissertation. Another interesting study by Fisher et al. (2002), explores information asymmetry
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effects on budgetary proposals, budget slack, and performance. This research is complementary and
may help to build upon the phenomena examined by this dissertation. Technical debt may be a
primary contributor to people maintaining unhealthy levels of budgetary slack. This research also
supports future research ideas suggested by Stablein et al. (2018), where they view Arrow’s (1985)
seminal work on the behavior of physicians and moral hazard as potentially having a similar effect
within IT organizations, where the incentive to behave in a negative way following a strategic IT
investment is high.
While I have incorporated some questions into the superordinate version of the instrument
in Appendix J that discover drivers and capabilities, there is more research required to flesh out the
phenomenon briefly described in Chapter 6. The phenomenon can be described as a requirement to
have a direct link between IT investments and enterprise level value drivers. This connection is too
often one of platitudes without measurable linkage. This may ultimately result in an enhanced
version of the instrument, although it may warrant a discrete instrument with a broader goal.
While the instrument has direct value, as perceived by the practitioner that participated in its
design and evaluation and as discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter, one insight surfaced
repeatedly throughout the engagement: “you have to map out the IT organization to understand
what are the big things I need to be concerned about, from an architectural perspective, and use that
as context for these investment decisions.” Future research will benefit from exploring how
enterprise frameworks and tools targeted at providing this mapping, e.g., IT-CMF, TOGAF, etc.,
and employed by large complex firms, are (at least in the case of the firm employing the participant
who co-created the artifact) failing to deliver the intended information and insights required to drive
improved investment decisions.
A final area of future research and perhaps the most exciting involves measuring technical
debt throughout the lifecycle of an investment. It is reasonable to believe that different types of
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technical debt occur more frequently at different points during an investment’s lifecycle. For
example, requirement debt may occur quite frequently during the initial planning of an investment,
design debt may be concentrated during the design of a solution, code debt will be incurred during
development, test debt will be high during testing, and infrastructure debt accumulates after a
technical solution begins to age.
In conclusion, large complex organizations spend significant amounts of their annual
budgets fixing and maintaining investments in IT assets. Typically, IT assets are implemented under
pressures to deliver on time and within a prescribed budget. Inevitably, this results in cutting corners
and doing things the easiest or fastest way, resulting in hidden future costs for supporting and
adapting the technology. This recurring expense reduces agility and increases opportunity costs.
With the need to invest in emerging transformational technologies, e.g., blockchain, IoT, AI,
machine learning, etc., opportunity costs have significantly grown. Exploring how trade-offs are
made between quick and easy implementation of IT assets and the future costs, or technical debt, of
fixing and maintaining these assets may lead to more profitable IT investment.
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Appendix A: Types of Technical Debt from Alves et al. (2016)
Type
Design debt

Definition
Refers to debt that can be discovered by analyzing the source code and identifying violations of
the principles of good object-oriented design (e.g. very large or tightly coupled classes).

Architecture debt

Refers to the problems encountered in product architecture, for example, violation of
modularity, which can affect architectural requirements (performance, robustness, among
others). Normally this type of debt cannot be paid off with simple interventions in the code,
implying more extensive development activities.
Refers to the problems found in software project documentation and can be identiﬁed by
looking for missing, inadequate, or incomplete documentation of any type.
Refers to issues found in testing activities that can affect the quality of those activities. Examples
of this type of debt are planned tests that were not run, or known deﬁciencies in the test suite.

Documentation debt
Test debt
Code debt

Defect debt

Refers to the problems found in the source code that can negatively affect the legibility of the
code making it more diﬃcult to maintain. Usually, this debt can be identiﬁed by examining the
source code for issues related to bad coding practices.
Refers to known defects, usually identiﬁed by testing activities or by the user and reported on
bug tracking systems, that the Conﬁguration Control Board (CCB) agrees should be ﬁxed but,
due to competing priorities and limited resources, have to be deferred to a later time. Decisions
made by the CCB to defer addressing defects can accumulate a signiﬁcant amount of TD for a
product, making it harder to ﬁx them later.

Requirements debt

Refers to tradeoffs made with respect to what requirements the development team needs to
implement or how to implement them. Some examples of this type of debt are: requirements
that are only partially implemented, requirements that are implemented but not for all cases,
requirements that are implemented but in a way that doesn’t fully satisfy all the non-functional
requirements (e.g. security, performance, etc.).

Infrastructure debt

Refers to infrastructure issues that, if present in the software organization, can delay or hinder
some development activities. Some examples of this kind of debt are delaying an upgrade or
infrastructure ﬁx.
Refers to people issues that, if present in the software organization, can delay or hinder some
development activities. An example of this kind of debt is expertise concentrated in too few
people, as an effect of delayed training and/or hiring.
Refers to the work involved in automating tests of previously developed functionality to support
continuous integration and faster development cycles. This debt can be considered a subtype of
test debt.
Refers to ineﬃcient processes, e.g. what the process was designed to handle may be no longer
appropriate.
Refers to issues that make the build task harder, and unnecessarily time consuming. The build
process can involve code that does not contribute to value to the customer. Moreover, if the
build process needs to run ill-deﬁned dependencies, the process becomes unnecessarily slow.
When this occurs, one can identify build debt.
Refers to the inappropriate selection and substitution of web services that lead to mismatch of
the service features and applications’ requirements. Besides, this type of debt also leads to underor overutilization of the system by integrating a service that does not use the system resources in
the expected way (for instance, lack of memory due to a service that does not follow the
expected data processing process, or lack of performance due to a service that does not use the
available memory for the task). This kind of debt is relevant for systems with service-oriented
architectures.
Refers to inappropriate usability decisions that will need to be adjusted later. Examples of this
debt are lack of usability standard and inconsistence among navigational aspects of the software.
Refers to problems in source code versioning, such as unnecessary code forks.

People debt

Test automation debt

Process debt
Build debt

Service debt

Usability debt
Versioning debt
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Appendix B: Muma College of Business Journal Ranking
ISDS Journals
Premier Journals
Information Systems Research
Management Science
MIS Quarterly
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Top Tier Journals
Information & Management
Journal of MIS
Decision Support Systems
European Journal of Information Systems
Information Systems
Information & Software Technology
Journal of AIS
Journal of information technology
Journal of Strategic Information Systems
Information Sciences
ACM Transactions on MIS
Non-Discipline Based Journals by Related Areas
Faculty Can Make a Case for Premier Status
Computer Science
ACM Transactions on KDD
ACM Transactions on Info Systems
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge &Data
Engineering
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, &
Cybernetics
Statistics
Journal of American Statistical Association
Journal of the Royal Statistical society- Series A, B,
C
Annals of Statistics
Statistical Science
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics
Annals of Probability
International Journal of Forecasting
Annals of Applied Statistics

Operations Management
Journal of Operations Management
Production & Operations Management
Operations Research
Mfg. & Service Operations Management
Math Programming
Omega
Naval Research Logistics
European J. of Operations Research
Computers and OR
Decision Sciences
Healthcare
J. of the American Medical Association
J. of the American Medical Informatics
Association
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Appendix C: First Set of Interviews – Guiding Set of Interview Questions
a. Describe the type of information technology decisions you have made in the last five years
that have materially contributed to the information systems architecture of the firm.
b. Describe the solution options available and primary driving forces behind selection of a
solution and its underlying technology.
c. Describe your experiences with IT and Business architects in the decision-making process.
d. Describe your experiences with business and function stakeholders in the decisions.
e. Describe your experiences with IT executives in the decisions.
f. Describe the existence of and reliance upon architectural standards in the decision-making
process.
g. Describe the involvement of business and information technology stakeholders not directly
benefiting from the solution.
h. Describe your feelings of control of the overall contribution of the IT investments.
i.

Describe your experience managing priorities for your team.

j.

Describe your experiences engaging with resources when it comes time for them to
contribute to your priorities.
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Appendix D: Mind Map of Coding
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Appendix E: Sample Mapping of Data to Themes
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Appendix F: Second Set of Interviews – Guiding Set of Interview Questions

Interview questions

1. Describe the types of IT investment your firm makes on an annual basis.
2. Describe the IT investment decision-making process at your organization, including the
roles played by different departments. (If not covered, ask if there is a different process for
projects/programs that arise throughout the year that weren’t approved during the annual
budget process)
3. What level of resources are involved in the IT investment decision-making process at each
stage?
4. Describe the inputs required by finance professionals involved in the IT investment
decision-making process.
5. Talk me through one good IT investment decision in which you were involved during the
past 12 months. Share the length of the investment process, information supporting the
decision, resources involved, and ultimate decision.
6. Talk me through a bad IT investment decision in which you were involved during the past
12 months. Share the length of the investment process, information supporting the decision,
resources involved, and ultimate decision.
7. How do you measure the risk to successful implementation of an IT investment?
8. Describe the process by which enterprise-level value is considered during the IT investment
decision-making process, in contrast to business unit or functional value.
9. How are benefits tracked for an IT investment? (While this will vary by type of IT
investment, leaving the question broad may yield insight into how IT versus Finance
professionals view the importance of tracking benefits)
10. Do you believe there is asymmetric information between IT and Finance when making IT
investment decisions? If so, do you believe it materially impacts the decision?
11. Does trust play a role in the IT investment decision-making process?
Additional questions:
1. How much annual IT investment (planned multiyear and annual actual) were you
accountable for in 2016 and 2017?
2. What was your role in 2016 and 2017?
3. Have you worked in the business at any point in your career? If so, for how long and in
what role(s)?
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Appendix G: Version 2 of the Instrument Used to Facilitate the Final Design Session
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Appendix H: Results of the Second Instrument Design Iteration
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Appendix I: Proposed Instrument Content
Instrument goal. At the time a strategic IT investment decision is made, the goal is to
better understand where an information system is most at risk, through improvements in predicting
corrective maintenance costs and the quality of applications, prior to approval and implementation.
Instrument summary description. The instrument includes a description of four types of
technical debt. The technical debt types are classes of information asymmetry that exist during the
strategic IT investment decision-making process. This instrument is designed to be incorporated
into an existing business case artifact or to serve as a standalone artifact to compliment the strategic
IT investment decision-making process. It requires identification of information that has never been
or is not consistently shared, which has the potential to cause material debt to be incurred by an
organization in the form of unexpected maintenance costs supporting the enterprise information
system if the proposed investment is implemented.
The taxonomy introduced in Study 1 is extended as a contribution of this research. The
extension is in the form of subtypes for each technical debt type. The identification of subtypes
surfaced as the researcher applied his 15+ years of experience to the analysis of the collected data.
The instrument includes four types of technical debt: requirement debt, documentation debt,
infrastructure debt, and architecture debt.
In a perfect world, CIOs and other executives would understand the vocabulary of the 15
technical debt types. One goal of this research is to develop a taxonomy for the intersection of
technical debt types and strategic IT investment decisions.
Requirement Debt
Definition
Refers to tradeoffs made with respect to what the requirements the development team needs
to implement or and how the manner in which to implement them. Some examples of this type of
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debt are: requirements that are only partially implemented, requirements that are implemented but
not for in only some all cases, requirements that are implemented but in a way that does not fully
satisfy all the non-functional requirements (e.g., security, performance, etc.) (Kruchten et al., 2012).
Exemplar Quotes
Like years ago, we’re doing a big processor upgrade at a previous bank. It was like the thing
the bank wanted to do that year on the sales and trading technology drill. I’ve got like
support of the Board of Directors doing it, and then about a week before we were going to
do the big, and actually it was an Easter conversion because we needed like, we needed some
downtime or some Bank Holiday in the UK to get it done. Like a week short of the Easter
conversion, got an email from somebody in Latin America saying ‘Oh you can’t convert that
system next week because we’ve just realized we do like reporting to the Brazilian Central
Bank from it, and we weren’t factored into the plans, and blah, blah, blah, blah.’ Now,
everybody had had a number of emails. The bank had had emails on this conversion; it was
like a known, massive, long-term battle for the firm. Yet, you still have things like that that
pop up. [The instrument is targeted at reducing the information asymmetry that caused the
Latin American requirements (debt) to be incurred.]
So that was a large-scale internal product processor upgrade, and to me, though often in our
industry those are the most difficult things to do. It’s when you have maybe a sub-ledger or a
product processor that’s got a million plus transactions on it, what we always find is there’s
another hundred systems connected to it, be it formal or informal, and something like MIS
spreadsheets, the local reg reporting. Whenever you start to unpick a core processor, you
find that it will still be like a factor of two, the level of really connections or file transfers
you’ve got from it versus what the records say. And that’s true for this bank or any of the
other five banks that work that. [The requirement debt incurred here is a product of not
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discovering all requirements for the connections to the system being impacted by the
investment.]
Questions
i. How many databases interface with the scope of this effort?
ii. Was an owner for each database identified?
iii. Did each owner of a dependent database sign off on the business case?
iv. What critical processes are driven by data that are integrated between the scope of this effort
and the rest of the enterprise information system?
v. How were the critical processes identified?
vi. Are the critical process dependencies documented?
vii. Who signed off on the critical processes approving the business case?
viii. Are the owners of critical dependent processes part of the program governance framework?
If so, in what capacity?
Documentation Debt
Definition
Refers to problems found in software project documentation and can be identified by
looking for missing, inadequate, or incomplete documentation of any type (Guo & Seaman, 2011)
Exemplar Quotes
A lot of times we also get industry imperatives, which business case doesn’t matter. We get
regulatory imperatives; business case doesn’t matter. Then we get the expired end of life
situations where business case doesn’t matter. You have no choice, you have to get off. So, a
lot of our portfolio is not really up for discretion, even if ... Timing is something that has
discretion in some cases, but we feel like it’s a little bit easier to navigate that funding
proposition without having to go to that level of maturity around detailed business case and
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consequence if the assumptions are wrong. [The lack of documentation for these nondiscretionary investments may be a source of information asymmetry.]
… it provides opportunities for a lot of skunk works and things like that if they don’t get
funded through IT for IT but somehow it just magically gets absorbed by these assets. [The
implication is that skunk works investments are not documented and, if they are, the
documentation isn’t shared. Either way, this is a source of information asymmetry.]
So, what I would say is, it depends on the business unit and it depends on the relationship
with technology in that domain. It also depends a little bit on the complexity of the business.
So, to give you an example, our retail brokerage business is a lot different than our
institutional trading business. One of the reasons it’s so much different in terms of the way
that they consume technology, is that the retail platform has to service 7,500 advisors. The
institutional platform has to service about 100 traders, and so the variability of demand
between those two problem statements is really dramatic. It’s much easier to manage without
a product manager in the institutional business than it is in the retail business. What we’ve
had to do in the case of the retail business is build an entire product management function
whose job it is to solicit the ideas of all the different variations because invariably what we’d
get is, we’d have one expert FA tell us “This is absolutely what we need as a group and if we
don’t have this we’re going to go out of business.” And then we’d have another expert
advisor, just as accomplished, say the opposite. [The documentation debt evident in this
comment is not straightforward. It is hidden in the fact that if documentation were available
that reconciled the use cases for the current system and aligned them to the functionality
that was built, it would provide a needed baseline that an organization could use to discover
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which of the opposing requirements is new and which advisor group should pay for the new
required functionality.]
Yeah, I think both circumstances are true in that lack of communication certainly is
treacherous for estimation, right? If both parties are not collaborating and trying to really get
to the size and scale question, that’s an issue. Even in cases where they are collaborating, I
think it is plausible in circumstances where the domain is not well understood, that even
with best efforts and best communication, there’s just a general lack of familiarity with depth
of the problem. For instance, I’m thinking of a data problem that we had last year. It was
poor data quality that we were trying to remediate, and even with the experts involved, there
was a vast underestimate of how bad the data actually turned out to be. And so, the cleanup
process was many orders of magnitude more than was originally speculated by the best
efforts of all parties involved. It’s pretty rare that people overestimate effort though. I would
say that in all of my years, it’s a rarity. [The documentation debt reflected in this comment
exists because current state performance metrics do not reveal the state of data. If issues
with the current data were documented and actively owned and managed by someone, this
would have informed the team challenged with designing and implementing the new
investment.]
Questions
ix.

Were the applications, databases, and networks impacted by or relied on by this
investment adequately documented prior to the preparation of this business case? If not,
list the gaps that made generating this business case more complicated and/or timeconsuming.

x.

Has all current and planned work being done in the O&M budget been reviewed as to
potential impact to this investment?
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xi.

Who owns documenting benefits realization and lessons learned six, 12, or 24 months
after go-live?

xii.

Is the total cost of ownership of the current and future cost of the impacted and “to-be”
system understood? Has it been quantified and approved by Finance and IT
management? (This will have the ancillary benefit of reinforcing the scope of the
investment.)

xiii.

Have the qualifications (technical, domain, leadership, social/behavioral) of non-IT
SMEs required for the design and implementation of the investment been documented?
Evaluated? If evaluated, by whom?

xiv.

Have the qualifications (technical, domain, leadership, social/behavioral) of all technical
experts required for the design and implementation of the investment been documented?
Evaluated? If evaluated, by whom?
Infrastructure Debt

Definition
Refers to infrastructure issues that, if present in the software organization, can delay or hinder some
development activities. Some examples of this kind of debt include delaying an upgrade or
infrastructure fix.
Exemplar Quotes
A bad example would be something like where we upgraded an AIX platform to the latest
OS’s and patches and things like that while just turning around and executing on a program
which was to completely get off of AIX platform and onto a virtual Linux. That’s an
example where they could’ve saved probably a year and a half’s worth of internal labor
investment and risk to remediate those platforms but because of the corner they painted
themselves into they had to do it anyway even though they knew that they were getting off
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of that platform. [This is a straightforward example of aging technology not being kept
current and the impact being absorbed by the business, which is not able to quickly pivot to
a new platform.]
But it’s because that, Thomas, I won’t oversimplify that. That is a constant battle whether it’s
a year where we think we got a lot of technology dollars, or it’s a year where we think we
haven’t got a lot of technology dollars, it’s still a constant battle with business requirements
versus helping the platform. [This is an admission that infrastructure debt is consciously
absorbed, as keeping the platform current competes with discretionary investments.]
What you have to do is remind them that “Hey, guys. By the way, we’ve got this 2009
window kit still in our architecture. Or in our settlement system, we’ve got a system from
1989 in 2018. What the hell are we going to do about it?” So, I do two versions in kind of
my overall job as kind of leader of it all, I actually kind of care for what level of detail I
managed it. But I bet it did two things. Of all new implementations and additions, I always
won a reduction in overall number of components in our architecture every year, and I
wondering, if you call it finance services, on a shortened duration of the portfolio, as well.
So, we’re always looking at what’s the very oldest things we’ve got, and we’re sweeping those
up with plans to renew them or get them off. And then I’m hoping that, you know that sets
it up for the future where if we miss on a big theme, or if we woke up one morning, it’s like
“Hey Goldman Sachs have done this!” If we’ve got fairly new architecture, or fairly modern
technology, and fewer moving parts then we can move and adjust a lot quicker than if we
had like 5,000 moving parts and architecture that goes back to 1969. [This comment
reinforces the need for managing infrastructure debt. This is the only participant that seemed
to be informed about the overall aging of his technology stacks. This comment also provides
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insight into what type of questions should be included to ensure infrastructure debt is well
understood when a new IT investment is proposed.]
Questions
xv.

Does every technology asset involved in the investment have an upgrade or training (for
human capital) plan?

xvi.

Are upgrade and training costs provided specifically in future period non-discretionary
budgets at the asset owner and team level?

xvii.

Has each technology asset not currently in the most recent release have a cost estimated
and documented to get current?

xviii.
xix.

Have the impacts of non-current technology assets been evaluated and documented?
Was a list of backlogged upgrade projects for all technology assets readily available to the
preparers of this business case? If so, who maintains and supplies it?

xx.

Has the support profile for every technology asset impacted by the investment been
documented? (This support profile requires assessing the level of competency, skill, and
domain knowledge required to support the current assets, in addition to the capacity of
the competency, skill, and domain knowledge within the organization—FTEs vs.
Consultants—and the depth of the bench for each asset.
Architecture Debt

Definition
Refers to problems encountered in product architecture, for example, a violation of modularity,
which can affect architectural requirements (performance, robustness, etc.). Normally this type of
debt cannot be paid off with simple interventions in the code, implying more extensive development
activities (Brown et al., 2010; Kruchten et al., 2012).
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Exemplar Quotes
Our networks are too complex. [This comment implies that the network would have been
architected differently had the executive designed it. It also implies that at some point
enterprise architecture was not a primary driver for IT investment or the network would not
have wound up being “too” complex.]
And there’s like an inverse cascade approval process, so the guy two down could be
approved by his business partner. His boss and the business equivalent then approve, and
then it comes to me and I approve. I present it to the president and he approves, and then it
goes to the CEO and the CFO and they approve. And at each level, I guess the details
becomes less, and the abstraction becomes greater. So, once you get to the CEO level, we’re
probably looking at things more like the investment categories that I answered in question
one. [If IT investment transpires as described by this executive—unless there is some
enterprise architectural function that wasn’t mentioned—it is easy to see how systems end
up too complex and not engineered to efficiently function. Senior executives may become
‘rubber stampers’ of IT investment.]
So, I primarily do, at the very highest level we chase two targets every year, fewer number of
applications in the architecture, and younger technology in the architecture. [This comment
is important, as it provides guidance on the type of data required to ensure architecture debt
is assessed.]
You know, I do think we have that, and part of my job is that last bit you touched on which
is that conversation about “Listen, I know you want to do all these things. I know we’re in
competition with J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley, but we really do have to get rid of this
piece of hardware or upgrade this system that’s no longer supported by the software
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vendor.” And I think that’s the part of a, you know, really you have to have a technology
group and a technology management area that have backbone, because I’ve seen it in
organizations where basically people get bullied by the business into doing whatever the
business wants to do. And like you say, you wake up one morning in five years’ time
realizing that there are a lot of things that should have been done along the way, and now
you’ve got a massive legacy problem. [This comment highlights how architecture debt arises
and provides insight into what type of information should be collected and provided so an
organization doesn’t wake up one morning and discover a massive legacy problem.]
Questions
xxi.

Is there a single “product owner” type resource accountable for the enterprise network?
If so, did this person author and/or sign-off on the design, risks, estimates, etc. related
to this investment’s impact on the current network?

xxii.

Has this investment been evaluated against all other material investments that have been
approved? If so, how was the evaluation performed? Who signed off on the impact
evaluation?

xxiii.

Is it understood if this investment will reduce the overall age of the enterprise’s
architecture? Provide support for the answer.

xxiv.

Has the business case, including all supporting information related to design, impact, etc.
been reviewed by an independent third party with expertise in this type of investment?
Explain the third party’s relationship to the firm and supply the results of the evaluation.
(Note: this evaluation may rely upon internal expertise, e.g., in the case where one
business unit has implemented a similar investment or has expertise on their team that
have implemented a similar investment at another firm). The key to adequately satisfying
this requirement is that, in addition to having the required technical and domain
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experience/knowledge, the third party is unbiased and removed from professional
influence and the potential for pressure from investment sponsors.
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Appendix J: Final Instrument
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